|
THE NATION:
VEERAPPAN
Operation
Jungle Storm
Karnataka
and Tamil Nadu make a renewed bid to catch the outlaw but unless the Centre
helps, it won't be easy
By
Arun Ram and Stephen David in Dhinbum
Ghats
A
few hours before daybreak on November 23, a dozen commandos of Tamil Nadu's
Special Task Force (STF), clad in army fatigues, are on their way back
to the base camp at Varattupallam. It is a speck in the 6,000 sq km fiefdom
of the dreaded Koose Muniswamy Veerappan. The tightly packed vegetation
does not allow visibility beyond 10 ft even during daytime. The terrain
changes rapidly from rocky to slushy; from a towering green canopy to
valleys cloaked with 6-ft tall grass. Elephants appear suddenly and the
commandos freeze and allow them to pass. The band of policemen wends its
way carefully through the jungle watching out for booby traps or land
mines. Their AK-47s are always half cocked, their fingers never far from
the triggers. They know their enemy is faster, swifter and more dangerous
than any they have encountered. Someone who has successfully eluded with
impunity two state task forces with around 1,000 men and an annual budget
of Rs 5 crore. Someone who is oozing with confidence after his daring
kidnap of film star Rajkumar that had brought the two states down on their
knees.
 |
| As STF
commandos set out on their mission, the balance still lies with Veerappan
given his familiarity with the terrain and his intelligence network |
After Rajkumar's
dramatic release on November 15, both the governments of Karnataka and
Tamil Nadu announced that their special task forces were resuming operations
to flush out Veerappan from the Satyamangalam forests. About 70 km away
from where the commandos were scouring the jungle at the Tamil Nadu Task
Force's nodal camp at Bhannari, some corrections were being made to a
confidential document titled "Operation Jungle Storm-II". The
draft copy read thus: "Objectives (1) To capture forest brigand Veerappan
and his gang members dead or alive within 60 days. (2) To neutralise any
other armed gang that may be encountered inside the forest." A neat
stroke of black ink runs across the figure 60 and superscribed is the
number 90. "Actually I have set no deadline for capturing him,"
Inspector-General V. Balachandran, in charge of the STF operations, told
India Today. "It may happen tomorrow. It may take more than a month."
In neighbouring Karnataka, in an attempt to show it meant business, the
Government appointed H.T. Sangliana, a Mizoram-born 1967 cadre Karnataka
IPS officer as its STF chief. Sangliana, a no-nonsense, tough-talking
officer, had in his younger days earned a reputation for derring-do. In
the late 1980s, two Kannada films were made on his life called Sangliana
IPS 1 and Sangliana IPS 2. Sangliana's appointment has boosted the morale
of the existing force. "We are launching an all-out war to arrest
Veerappan and his associates," says Karnataka Chief Minister S.M.
Krishna.
It's
Advantage Veerappan—For Now: Despite the hype, it is apparent
that newer strategies to close in on Veerappan are yet to be worked out.
In the past, the main reason for the task forces of the two states' inability
to get the outlaw was their poor knowledge of the vast terrain that the
bandit operates in, inadequate intelligence and very little co-ordination
between them. Realising that they need to drastically change their techniques,
key officers from both the states met Union Home Ministry officials last
week to plead for help.
This time,
the stress is on boosting intelligence gathering. Though there has been
talk for some time of using scientific techniques like aerial surveillance
of the forest in the STF operations, nothing concrete has materialised.
Now the state governments want the Centre to use satellites to map the
terrain and possibly trace movements or to do regular aerial surveillance,
as is done along India's borders. Tracking the outlaw is difficult because
the two task forces are no match for his incredible network of informants
and his skill of being constantly on the move. Inhabitants of hundreds
of villages bordering the jungle hold the key to vital information. And
this is not forthcoming. Veerappan has succeeded considerably in emerging
as a hero among the villagers even while keeping them in the grip of fear.
Says one officer: "Hours after we plan an operation, Veerappan always
comes to know about it."
The two
states have also asked for personnel specially trained in jungle warfare
to help the STFs. The commandos of the two forces neither have thorough
knowledge of the terrain nor the ability to survive there. Most of them
are trained in the forests for about two months before they get on board.
The sessions include scaling steep inclines, learning tracking methods
and shooting while dangling from a tree or darting from bushes. There
are obvious flaws in the way they go about it. The STF often suspends
combing operations by sunset and returns to the barracks. They usually
don't step out during the rains. Says a former army officer: "For
these operations, STF commandos should learn to live in the jungles on
their own for a minimum of five or six days. There is no point in combing
and returning to the base camps. You must learn to survive on your own."
With Defence Minister George Fernandes ruling out army help, the states
want the commando units under the National Security Guard or the Indo-Tibetan
Border Police to come to their rescue.
If they
do it, it will not be the first time that Central forces have been employed
to tackle Veerappan. In June 1993, Border Security Force (BSF) personnel
stepped in but beat a hasty retreat a year later as they could neither
acquaint themselves with the terrain nor surmise Veerappan's movements.
Three years ago, the Centre sent the force in again but it pulled out
after two of its men were shot dead by Veerappan. This time round, the
Home Ministry has made it clear that it does not want to send its men
"into a blind alley" and would prefer to beef up prior intelligence.
Admits Balachandran: "Even one lakh commandos would not be enough"
to catch up with Veerappan unless they are equipped with a better system
of tracking and moving around in the jungles.
While the
STFs themselves rule out an air-strike-"it is not suited for the
terrain"-they are seeking Central assistance for helicopters. The
choppers, it is believed, can withstand small-arm fire and airdrop at
least half-a-dozen commandos near Veerappan's hide-out. While the small
group monitors his movement (or engages him in a fighting), the chopper
can fly back to the nearest camp and bring in more men.
There is
no stress on augmenting firepower though. Notwithstanding reports that
Veerappan has acquired modern weaponry, sources say he has only a limited
stock of arms and ammunition. He is learnt to have made frantic efforts
to procure AK-47s through his new extremist friends when Rajkumar was
held captive. The Veerappan gang is believed to be equipped with SLRs
and explosives though the leader himself prefers a .303. But that would
be no threat to the STF. The army's help is being sought only to detect
mines that might be laid by Veerappan's men.
As of now,
the STFs are going by the "flooding strategy" where the forces
have been divided into compact groups of 20 each. It is estimated that
to efficiently comb the 6,000 sq km of forest territory, at least 100
such groups are needed. The current strength of the two STFs put together
is just 700. All the same, these forces will work in tandem until help
arrives from the Centre.
The STFs
don't see Veerappan's growing links with Tamil militants aligned to groups
like the Tamil Nadu Liberation Army and Tamil Nadu Retrieval Force as
a disadvantage. Besides arms, these groups have also been supplying recruits
to Veerappan whose gang strength is believed to be around 30. Explains
a senior police officer: "Earlier it was difficult to track him but
now we can keep a watch on these militants and zero in on him."
The forces
also hope that Veerappan will stumble because of his newfound confidence
post-Rajkumar's abduction. Says another officer: "We expect a change
in the brigand's strategy. In the past 10 years, he has never fought back
but only fled when attacked. With new strength, Veerappan will think of
hitting back. And once he decides to encounter us, the victory is ours."
Famous last words?
Top
|
Orthodoxy in economic thought is as odious as obscurantism in the socio-religious context. INDIA TODAY Associate Editor, V Shankar Aiyar, offers a contrarian take on the stock markets and the cause and the impact of policy and practice. 