Is there a defensible argument for the non-existence of time?
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"Broad described this as a 'philosophical "howler"' and I would agree that it seems that something untoward is happening in this argument: it reeks of some form of equivocation (1978: 142). Broad and Van Inwagen both criticise McTaggart on the basis of ambiguities over temporal and non-temporal copulas (1978: 117-142) (2002: 56-72). I feel that this it would be unnecessarily complicating this discussion to go into the details of their analysis so instead I shall merely offer my own criticism. I do not discount what they have to say: indeed, the criticism I am propounding will doubtless be merely saying what has been said before, but using different words. My own view is that there is no contradiction at all. Ultimately, I feel that the confusion results out of the fact that the terms 'past' and 'present' are not positive adjectives (using the word 'positive' in the technical grammatical sense) but rather are a form of comparative adjective, in that they can only be true in relation to something. An event or moment on its own has no property of pastness, it is past in relation to the present moment; compare this with other positive adjectives, such as 'red': an object on its own can be red; it is not in relation to anything else that it needs to be red.
"Where McTaggart has gone wrong is in not making explicit what the words past and future actually mean; he is making them positive adjectives rather than comparative. When we say something is past or future, it is always in relation to a specific moment, or group of moments. Generally, in everyday discourse, this is assumed to be the present moment as we are experiencing it. So when we say the birth of Galileo is in the past, we are implicitly saying that the birth of Galileo is past compared to this specific present moment. When we say the same thing ten minutes later, we are saying a slightly different thing. Now, the way in which past, present and future are incompatible is if they are in relation to the same moment. McTaggart says that a moment is past, present and future at different times, so they are past, present and future in relation to different moments, and are thus not incompatible. The only thing which McTaggart could be meaningfully saying then is this: a moment is future in relation to moment one, present in relation to moment two and past in relation to moment three. This clearly is not a contradiction.
"I remarked before that the terms past and future are only meaningful in relation to something; they are, in a sense, comparative. Bearing that in mind, here is a spatial analogue as a further illustration of my point; a counter-example which clearly shows the fallacy. The terms taller, same size as and shorter are incompatible. But yet I am all three: I am taller, the same size as, and smaller (I know that this is abusing the English language, but the temporal argument is only more palatable because the terms past and future sound like positive adjectives. This is because that which is the temporal term is compared to, that is, the present, is always assumed). But, you will say, I am only taller in relation to someone else, and the same goes for smaller than. But that someone else must themselves be smaller than, the same size as, and taller than, and again you are led into contradiction. Thus an A-series of heights, that is, a classing of height in terms of how much taller or smaller other people are than you, is impossible.""But that's ridiculous!" George exclaimed, "You can't just divorce a comparative adjective from the two things it is comparing! Saying 'you are taller than,' on its own makes no sense..."
"Exactly, and that is what I am arguing McTaggart does. The only reason it seems palatable to us is that normally, when we say an event is past, the fact that we are comparing the event to the present moment is left implicit."