Russell's Theory of Descriptions: Why might empty definite descriptions seem puzzling?
Russell's theory of descriptions was an attempt in part to answer the puzzle of empty definite descriptions. I shall outline Russell's theory and Strawson's response to the theory and argue that Strawson does not offer any substantive criticisms of Russell's theory. It thus seems to be that Russell is entirely successful in his explanation of the puzzle.
The puzzle of empty definite descriptions arises from the fact that what Russell calls definite descriptions, such as 'the author of Waverly' or 'the present King of France' can function grammatically as the subject of a sentence, in the same way as names, such as 'Scott' and 'Mr Blair' and pronouns, such as 'this' and 'he.' In most cases in everyday discourse where we would use definite descriptions no problem arises, because the definite description is referring to something which exists, such as 'Scott is the author of Waverly.' These sentences are meaningful and have an obvious truth-value. However, some sentences can appear to be meaningful despite not having an obvious truth-value, such as 'The King of France is wise.' This can lead to the consequence that non-existent entities must in some sense subsist, or that the law of excluded middle must be rejected. The argument for this consequence is as follows:
1. If we accept the law of excluded middle, then, in all cases of significant sentences, either the sentence or the negation of the sentence is true.
2. 'The present King of France is wise' (from now on, I will refer to this sentence as S) is significant.
3. Neither S nor the negation of S (that is, 'the present King of France is not wise') is true, unless there is something which is the King of France.
4. Therefore, if we accept the law of excluded middle, then there must in some sense exist (or subsist) the King of France.
The law of excluded middle is generally wished to be preserved by philosophers as fundamental: it was one of Aristotle's three 'Laws of Thought.' It is for this reason that philosophers such as Meinong did indeed argue that non-existent entities did in some sense subsist: there exists, in some sense, a world of unicorns and round squares and Kings of France. Russell rejected this on the grounds that it was contrary to our 'feelings of reality.' This makes sense, and Strawson agrees that the above is a bad argument. Simply by the definition of existence, it is obvious that nothing which is unreal exists, so postulating a world of subsisting non-existent entities is nonsensical: it is to twist the meaning of the word 'existence.'