Is there a defensible argument for the non-existence of time?
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"But surely the changing relations are simply changing in relation to 'now,' the present moment. It is indeed true that A-series relations are changing relations, but they are not relations between two events, as McTaggart seems to imply: they are the relation between an event and the present. Or, if you consider 'now,' to be an event, then it is not that the relation between two events that is changing as such, it is that the second event to which the first is being related is constantly changing: every moment it is a different event which constitutes the 'now,' and thus it is an entirely different relation. For example, Galileo's birth is, currently, 442 years and 11 days before the event which constitutes 'now.' Tomorrow it will be 442 years and 12 days before the event which constitutes 'now' -- this is a different event, so it is not really that any relations are changing, merely that the event to which we compare past and future events -- the 'now' -- is changing.Of course I accept that there are deep metaphysical problems arising from the fact that time changes in this way: it is certainly true that we don't know why it changes as it does, or how it can have a rate of change. But these problems, or others just as grave, are inevitable no matter what philosophical position one takes. Does my criticism make sense?"I think so. I would be inclined to agree with you that these changing relations are simply changing with respect to the present moment. There doesn't seem to be a contradiction in the fact that this present moment is constantly 'moving' -- we can wonder why it happens like that, but there is no reason not simply to accept it as a fact. Shall I progress to the next part of his argument?"
"This is the bit we've been waiting for. Go on."
"McTaggart next moves on to by far the most controversial part of his argument, what he calls a more 'positive difficulty' for the possibility of the A-series. In short, he argues that the A-series leads to contradiction. He begins by stating that the predicates 'past,' 'present' and 'future' are incompatible: an assumption, I think, it is impossible to disagree with; an event or a moment cannot be both past and future, for example. He then argues that every event has all of these properties at once: the present event x, for example, is present, was future and will be past, and that this is a contradiction. To which the obvious reply is...""That any event does not have these properties at the one time! There is nothing incompatible about an event being future then being present then being past. You practically say the reply by stating the supposed contradiction: no event is past present and future; it simply was future, is present and will be past. To which McTaggart's reply is..."
"That this leads to a vicious infinite regress. Because what are you meaning by saying that an event was future: you are saying that, at some point in the past, it is (back then) future. However, this 'point in the past' is at the same time a 'point in the present' and a 'point in the future.' Likewise, when you say that an event will be past, you are saying that its being past is at some point in the future. But this 'point in the future,' is, in exactly the same way as I examined the original event, a past point and a present point. You are merely moving the problem back a step: you are now discussing three moments (one of which is the same as the original moment) in time, each of which are past, present and future. And if you then say, that this is not a contradiction, because for each of the moments one can say, for example, that it merely is present, was future and will be past, then you encounter the same problem as before. Each time, if you say of a moment that it was past, is present and will be future (or similarly, is past and has been present and future, or is future and will be present and past) you are simply moving the contradiction up to a higher order. It is clear that this could continue indefinitely, creating an infinite regress. What makes this regress vicious is that at every stage there is contradiction, so you never escape the contradictory nature of the terms past, present and future. Thus, the A-series is impossible, because, as I described before, it is only the A-series which describes time in terms of past present and future."