Is there a defensible argument for the non-existence of time?
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"I hope that you will see that is does not matter how he defines change, as long as he is consistent in his definition. Indeed, though he does argue that relational change is the only form of change, this is not vital for the main brunt of his argument: all that matters is that the first two premisses of his argument hold true given his definition of change, and that his definition of change does not vary throughout the argument. The important thing is that he proves that the A-series is necessary for time, which he does if he proves that the A-Series is necessary for x and that x is necessary for time."
"And how does he prove that the A-series is necessary for change?"
"Simply because, without the A-series, how can anything really be said to change? For example, it is, was and always will be true that my birth is 422 years after the birth of Galileo. So, in terms of relations, nothing actually changes. The sort of change that McTaggart is dealing with is change in relation to the present moment, so obviously a present moment is necessary if this change is to occur. And obviously, this present moment only exists if we look at time as constituting an A-series rather than a B-series."
"Ok, I'll accept that, in terms of relational change, the A-series is obviously necessary. But is it not possible to have time without relational change of this sort? Certainly it would be necessary for the flow of time, but is a flow of time necessary for time itself? Might it not be the case that it is the flow of time which is unreal, not that time itself is unreal?"
"McTaggart does consider the possibility of time existing only as a B-series, not as an A-series, which would essentially be the same as time without a 'flow of time.' However, there cannot be time arising merely out of the B-series, because, as stated earlier, time involves change and, in the B-series, what can really be said to change? My birth, for example, does not constitute a change, because the characteristics of it were always the same and always will be the same. None of the facts about it change, because it was always true that I was born 422 years after the birth of Galileo, it was always true that the birth was of a certain duration, etc etc. So nothing has changed."
"I feel that you are abusing the word 'change' here, because, as you earlier admitted, it is not a logical certainty that change is necessary for time, in the broad, more usual sense of 'change.' Nonetheless, I shall let you away with it simply because it would be such a large digression to discuss what time would actually consist of if it didn't flow, and this is not my main criticism of the argument. I believe I am correct in thinking that time does flow, so it is unnecessary for me to argue about whether time would still exist if it doesn't. Go on with the rest of the argument."
"Well, having proved that the A-series is necessary for change, and that change is necessary for time (and thus obviously then that the A-series is necessary for time) he now sets out to prove the impossibility of the A-series. He proposes two arguments for this. The first, acknowledged by himself to be a weaker argument, has had little commentary from philosophers compared to the second argument. Nonetheless, I shall outline it to see what you think. McTaggart starts by stating that anything which is past, present or future must be so in relation to something outside the time-series. He argues that the relations of past, present and future constantly change, and that they must be changing in relation to something. However, no relations which are between two members of the time-series can ever change: the length of time between two events is and always was fixed. Thus these changing A-series relations cannot be changing in relation to something inside the time-series. The onus, then, would be on the defender of the A-series to find that something outside of time which the present changes in relation to. Clearly, that would be very hard to do."