Uneasy Truce: August 1964 to November 1967

Below is an account of this period from the standpoint of politics, violence, and migration, written by one of the few outside scholars to have studied this first-hand, the Canadian graduate student, Richard Patrick. This work was his dissertation. It demonstrates the power of accumulated and organized data, and in this provides a better sense of what actually was happening than virtually any other account. This is chapter four from his classic work, Political Geography and the Cyprus Conflict, 1963-1971.

THE PERIOD OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

11 AUGUST 1964 -15 NOVEMBER 1967

The battle at Kokkina in August 1964 had marked the end of the most violent stage of the Cyprus inter-communal conflict. Violence was not absent in the next phase of the conflict but it did decrease both in frequency and intensity, even though the major battle at Ayios Theodhoros marks the end of that stage. The majority of the Greek-Cypriot community accepted their government's appreciation that the achievement of enosis would take longer than originally expected, and they supported the decision to seek union with Greece by a reliance on political and economic means. On the other hand, a minority of Greek-Cypriots still adhered to an Aenosis now@ idea, and they continued to view armed coercion as the most appropriate means to achieve their goal. In the meantime, Turkish-Cypriots remained relatively united about the idea of taksim, about the decision to resist Greek-Cypriot control, and about the various means by which the Leadership and the Fighters attempted to implement their community's geopolitical goal. By November 1967, few changes had been made to the geopolitical fields which were already in existence in Cyprus in August 1964. However, a significantly new field had been created, that of the Greek-Cypriot intra-communal confrontation.

Divisions within the Greek-Cypriot community had been partially bridged by a common concern to defeat the Turkish-Cypriots and by the centralized military command established by General Grivas. However, after the Kokkina battle of August 1964, latent conflicts between 'Left= and 'Right', between Makarios and Grivas, and between the Cyprus Government and the Greek Government, assumed a more active form. The period of hectic military activity between December 1963 and August 1964 gave way to a time of organization and planning, which failed to divert the Greek- Cypriot community's attention from its internal stresses, as had the earlier excitement of battles and imminent invasion.

Although the various intra-communal conflicts had a variety of 'immediate' causes, a theme common to most of these disputes was whether enosis should be pursued by armed force or by political manoeuvres and economic sanctions. This theme was most clearly underlined by the National Guard command issue.

Friction between President Makarios and General Grivas had originally been based on a struggle for the leadership of the Greek-Cypriot community; it had become intensified by the fact that since the Kokkina battle, Makarios no longer shared Grivas' view that enosis could be achieved by military means. Since 15 August 1964, Grivas had assumed command of the National Guard in addition to his command of the Greek Army in Cyprus.

There was a continuing series of rumours that Grivas was planning to depose Makarios, and the General's actions often frustrated the President's political strategy and eroded international support for the Greek-Cypriot cause. This confrontation came to a head between February and May 1966. Makarios accused Grivas of creating conditions which could lead to civil war and asked the Greek government to limit the powers of Grivas over the National Guard.[footnote 1] At the same time, Makarios shifted Grivas' supporters out of key government posts and senior Greek-Cypriot ministers called on their community to rally round their President. Grivas demanded the removal of the Greek-Cypriot Minister of Defence, Polycarpos Yeorghidjis, and accused both this minister and Makarios of being responsible for a number of intra-communal bombings and for undermining enosis.[2] The Greek Cabinet was divided by this dispute and the Greek Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, Elias Tsirimokos, resigned amid reports that he sided against his colleagues by supporting Makarios= demands. By mid-May 1966 the governments in Athens and Nicosia both claimed that differences over the command of the National Guard had been bridged. Nevertheless, Grivas= control over the National Guard remained as firm as ever.

The Makarios government tried a different course. It reduced the National Guard allocations, appropriated an additional ,200,000 in the 1967 Budget for the Police Force, and undertook to recruit an additional 500 constables. Well-armed para-military police tactical reserve units, loyal to Makarios, were to be trained and based at main police headquarters throughout the island.[3] To arm this new Force, Makarios= government negotiated an arms deal with Czechoslovakia late in 1966. The original contract called for 1,000 rifles, 1,000 sub-machine guns, 20 rocket-launchers, 20 mortars and 20 armoured cars. Pressure from Turkey, the United Nations and perhaps even from Greece, stopped the Czechs from delivering the armoured cars. Most of the small arms which did reach Cyprus were kept in storage, though some were issued from time to time to replace damaged or out-of-date weapons already in use.[4]

This arms purchase was negotiated without prior consultations either with the Greek government or General Grivas. Athens newspapers attacked Makarios for buying Iron Curtain weapons with Greek-tax-payers' money. The Greek-Cypriot government countered by accusing Greece of maintaining a spy network in the National Guard and of being incompetent in its handling of the Cyprus question.[5]

On 8 April 1967 a major shooting incident occurred at the Turkish-Cypriot village of Mari.[6] It was reported that Athens had intervened to stop the National Guard from seizing Turkish- Cypriot positions on the perimeter of this village. General Grivas tendered his resignation apparently in protest at this interference. The Greek government refused to accept his resignation. Grivas insisted that he would not return to his office unless he were given a freer hand. These terms were accepted, and the General resumed his command on 16 April 1967.

An ominous situation had developed in Cyprus. Greek and Greek-Cypriot armed forces were not responsible to the government in Nicosia, nor were they closely controlled by the government in Athens. At the same time, the commander of these forces was dedicated to pursue enosis by force of arms, a policy rejected by both the Cyprus and Greek governments.

An indication of the nature of the Greek-Cypriot intra- communal conflict field can be derived through an analysis of bombing incidents during the period between the Kokkina battle of August 1964 and the Ayios Theodhoros battle of November 1967. Ninety-five separate bombing incidents have been recorded from various reliable primary sources.[7] . . . About 18 per cent of these bombings occurred in Turkish-Cypriot areas, 80 per cent in Greek-Cypriot areas, and 2 per cent in areas equally accessible to both communities. Probably 80 per cent of all these bombs set in Greek-Cypriot areas were laid by Greek-Cypriots themselves. This percentage may be even higher because the govern- ment was reluctant to publicize the extent of Greek-Cypriot intra-communal bombing incidents, and UNFICYP's attention was focussed primarily on Turkish-Cypriot quarters and villages. If we further examine this latter category of bombing incidents, we can be reasonably certain that about 70 per cent of this group was connected with minor vandalism, pranks and celebrations; 13 per cent was connected with business rivalries, attempts to defraud insurance companies, domestic quarrels, jealous suitors; 17 per cent was political in nature involving feuds between Leftists and Rightists, supporters of Grivas and supporters of Makarios. The majority of these Greek-Cypriot intra-communal political bombings were directed against AKEL [8] and PEO.[9] AKEL, a communist party, was the strongest political party on the island. PEO, a Left-wing labour federation controlled by AKEL, was the strongest trade union group in Cyprus. These organizations opposed the >enosis now= policy of Grivas' supporters, and were attacked on this score as well as on their communist philosophy. There was very little retaliation by Greek-Cypriot Left-wing groups, although on 12 October 1967, a Cyprus-bound aeroplane, apparently scheduled to carry Grivas, was believed to have been bombed in mid-air. All 66 people on board were killed.[10]

The Left-Right confrontation was further complicated by the 'Aspida= affair. Andreas Papandreou, son of the then Greek Prime Minister, visited Cyprus in 1965 and allegedly established a cell of the communist 'Aspida' organization among mainland Greek Army officers stationed in Cyprus. The aim of the organization was never publicly clarified, but it is probable that it established links with both AKEL and PEO. It may have had as its goal the establishment of an independent socialist state in Cyprus. As a result of investigations made by General Grivas, the 'Aspida' conspiracy was uncovered and Grivas became the chief witness at the subsequent trial of the Left-wing Army officers, in Greece.[11]

2. Movement: Economic Sanctions

The intervention of Turkey during August 1964 had ruled out, for the time being at least, a Greek-Cypriot military victory. The Makarios government was obliged to fall back on economic sanctions as the best remaining means to break the Turkish- Cypriot resistance to its authority. Nevertheless, many Cypriots of both communities believed that such sanctions, in the long run, would prove to be a more effective weapon than a military offensive. Had such an offensive continued, it would have invited a Turkish invasion and would have eroded the government's international political support. On the other hand, while the Turkish-Cypriot community had mustered an armed force with the potential, though limited, to resist such an offensive, that com- munity did not have the means to win an economic battle. Economic sanctions, unlike the deaths caused by military confrontations, would not offer a dramatic justification for a Turkish invasion. In August 1964, following the Kokkina battle, the government blockaded all movements of people and supplies into the Turkish-Cypriot enclaves of Nicosia, Lefka, Limnitis and Kokkina. On 5 September, the Turkish-Cypriot quarters of Famagusta and Larnaca were also blockaded.

The government subsequently eased its blockade. This action was partially in response to UNFICYP pressure, and to agreements by which the Turkish-Cypriots undertook, on their part, to allow Greek-Cypriot traffic to pass through Limnitis and along the Kyrenia-Nicosia highway in UNFICYP-controlled convoys.[12] The government also eased the blockade lest it caused so much hardship to the Turkish-Cypriots that it would force them into a desperate and violent action to encourage Turkey to invade. However, a most telling argument offered by some Greek-Cypriot leaders was that the extension of government control would follow from encouraging Turk-Cypriots to fraternise with Greek-Cypriots and by increasing the economic dependence of Turk-Cypriots on Greek-Cypriots. The blockade, by isolating the Turk-Cypriot communities socially and commercially, was in fact being counter-productive, for it served to increase inter-communal enmity, and to unite Turk-Cypriot factions behind chauvinistic TMT leaders.

The government's policy of economic sanctions subsequently reflected a compromise between attempting to destroy the Turk-Cypriot community's ability to resist government authority while not increasing its will to resist that authority.

By mid-September 1964, the enclaves of Nicosia, Lefka and Kokkina remained blockaded, although foodstuffs, clothing, kerosene and medical supplies were allowed in on a rationed basis. In all other areas of Cyprus, the only official economic restriction applied was a prohibition preventing Turk-Cypriots from buying or transporting items which had been published in the 13 "strategic materials" list of July 1964.[13] By 15 November, substantial freedom of movement had been allowed in and out of Lefka, and government-imposed rationing of non-strategic materials was not being maintained there. On 20 November 1964, the government removed rationing of non-strategic materials for the Turkish-Cypriot quarter of Nicosia, and allowed Turk-Cypriots to enter and leave that quarter subject to rigorous searches for strategic goods. During the period immediately preceding 20 November 1964, only 10 to 20 Turkish-Cypriots had been allowed to enter the quarter daily. About the same number were being turned away. In the first ten days following the lifting of movement restrictions, a daily average of 325 Turkish-Cypriots entered the Nicosia Turkish-Cypriot quarter. Within a few months 800 to 900 Turkish-Cypriots were daily passing in and out.[14]

During the entire period under review (i.e. August 1964 to November 1967) the government maintained its strict blockade of the Kokkina enclave, although on 10 June 1965 it lifted its restrictions on the import of non-strategic materials there as well. The strategic materials list was revised several times before it was withdrawn completely in March 1968. The most significant effect of this list was to prevent the importation of any building or maintenance materials, spare automotive or electrical parts into Turkish-Cypriot enclaves. The result was a progressive deterioration of Turkish-Cypriot housing and means of production.

The effects of the fighting between December 1963 and August 1964 and the economic sanctions imposed by the government are graphically illustrated by Figures 4-2 and 4-3 [not shown]. It is readily apparent that the 1964 recession in the Cypriot economy was due to the losses suffered by the Turkish-Cypriot community, and that the continued expansion of the Greek-Cypriot sector of the economy was hardly disturbed at all. In December 1966 UNFICYP estimated that about one-third of the entire Turkish-Cypriot community needed some form of welfare relief. It has been argued by Turk-Cypriots that the inter-communal conflict proved to be an unexpected economic boon to the Greek-Cypriot community. Funds normally paid to the Turk-Cypriot community were spent on Greek-Cypriots. Turk-Cypriot competition was removed. The United Nations Force and the Greek Army in Cyprus became a body of consumers for the goods and services of the Greek-Cypriot community. The recession of the Turk-Cypriot sector of the economy would have been even more severe were it not for Red Crescent relief shipments and financial aid from the Turkish government. By 1968 the Turkish government was injecting ,8,000,0000000 per annum into the Turkish-Cypriot economy. Apart from the welfare programmes Turkish-Cypriot political leaders, civil servants and the entire Fighter organization were also paid from these funds.[17]

We may now examine in greater detail the specific effects of the Makarios government's sanctions policy on the Turkish-Cypriot community.

(a) Agriculture

The hardest hit sector of the Turkish-Cypriot economy was agriculture.[18] Because Turk-Cypriot villages had been abandoned, and because some land was near National Guard positions or in insecure areas, much of the Turk-Cypriot grain, citrus and grape crop was not harvested in 1964. As a result of inter-communal tension, Turkish-Cypriots were unable to sell the grain and grapes which they did harvest through government marketing organizations. Many Turkish-Cypriot farmers had the choice of either selling the produce to Greek-Cypriot agents at cut-rate prices or not being able to sell their crops at all. However, by 1965 Turkish-Cypriot crops were being sold through government marketing boards, providing that the Turk-Cypriot farmers had arranged to pay off any debts owed to the government. Thus, the Grain Commission agreed to purchase the Turk-Cypriot grain crop, less 20 per cent to amortise outstanding debts which arose because the Commission had advanced the Turk-Cypriot Co-operative Bank funds in 1963 against the 1964 harvest, which had not been subsequently delivered to the Commission.

In 1966, UNFICYP estimated that about one-half of the farmland abandoned by Turk-Cypriots was being leased to Greek-Cypriots.[19] The government had responded to United Nations pressure and made it a punishable offence for Greek-Cypriots to use Turk-Cypriot land without the authority of the absentee Turk-Cypriot owner. In practice, Turk-Cypriots were often forced to lease their abandoned land at uneconomic rents. Any complaints by the Turk-Cypriot owner would result either in his land being damaged or in his receiving no return at all for his land. Turk-Cypriots by comparison had taken over only a very small amount of Greek-Cypriot farmland.[20] Most of this land was within the enclave north of Nicosia, and was being worked by refugees whose own land was being farmed by Greek-Cypriots. The Turk-Cypriot Leadership offered to pay the government a rental fee for this land but it was rejected as inadequate. In 1966 the government tried to finance a compensation fund for Greek- Cypriots whose land was under Turk-Cypriot control by imposing a deduction of 30 per cent on all Turkish-Cypriot grain, grown in the enclave north of Nicosia, which was sold through the Grain Commission. This deduction was in addition to the 20 per cent deduction already imposed to amortise other debts. No grain from this enclave was delivered to the Commission in 1966 and the 30 per cent penalty was subsequently removed.

(b) Public Utilities

The government's economic sanctions were only partially extended to public utilities.[21] By and large, the government refused to repair Turkish-Cypriot telephones which had been dis- connected in December 1963. Electricity and water supplies were not stopped, primarily because there was no way of disrupting these services to the Turkish-Cypriot quarters or villages without simultaneously cutting them off for a substantial portion of Greek-Cypriots as well. In some cases, however, local irregulars of both communities destroyed village water pumps and erected weirs which deprived downstream villages of sufficient irrigation water. However, in the arid landscape of Cyprus, such actions were motivated as much by a parochial concern to save ones own crops as by any inter-communal hostility.

The collection of debts for wafer and electricity from Turkish-Cypriots became a problem. Methods of payment varied throughout the island. In certain areas, Turk-Cypriots refused to pay the government for these services. In such cases the government could only collect public utilities= back debts if Turk-Cypriots were compelled to approach the government on some other matter such as the licensing of an automobile. The licence would not be issued until the utilities bill had been settled. In Larnaca, the water system had been owned by the Turkish-Cypriot community before December 1963. From that time, the government had taken control of this system but in compensation did not bill the Turkish-Cypriot quarters of Larnaca for electricity. In the Nicosia enclave, the Turkish-Cypriot administration charged the community for water and electricity, and deposited the funds in a >frozen account=. The eventual disposition of these funds was to be negotiated during any future political settlement.

Postal facilities for the Turkish-Cypriot community were disrupted; this situation arose in part because government officials were barred from entering Turkish-Cypriot controlled areas. At the same time, the government clearly did not want the postal service to be used as a means for organizing anti-government activities within the Turkish-Cypriot community.

On 15 October 1966, after prolonged negotiations sponsored by UNFICYP, the government appointed two postal agents in the Turkish-Cypriot quarter of Nicosia and one in Lefka, and the .Turkish-Cypriot administration established its own system of mail collection and distribution. In the towns and mixed villages where government postal facilities were open to Turk-Cypriots, local Turk-Cypriot leaders often barred their community members from using them since they believed that such use would constitute a recognition of government authority and would encourage fraternization. Turk-Cypriots also alleged that their mail was subjected to censorship of government postal inspectors.

(c) Government Welfare. Salaries and Grants

From December 1963 the government ceased to pay Social Insurance Benefits to Turkish-Cypriots, and the Turkish-Cypriots stopped paying contributions to the scheme.[21] In February 1966 the government resumed payments to some Turk-Cypriot beneficiaries whose entitlement had been established before December 1963. While the government refused to pay arrears to Turk-Cypriots for the period December 1963 to February 1966 it was willing to consider the cases of Turk-Cypriot claimants who could be freely visited by a government inspector and who had fully paid the necessary contributions. These provisions excluded the majority of the Turkish-Cypriot community.

Turkish-Cypriot spokesmen argued that Turk-Cypriot s who were civil servants had been coerced by Greek-Cypriot armed irregulars to leave their posts in December 1963. They demanded that these civil servants be put back on the government's pay-roll and that their salaries should be back-dated to December 1963. The government maintained that the Turk-Cypriot civil servants originally quitted and remained absent from their posts or orders from their own community's leaders, and that in these circumstances they were considered to have resigned from their posts.

Since the fighting of December 1963, the government had withheld an annual grant of ,400,000 to the Turkish-Cypriot Communal Chamber which had been payable under the provisions of the 1960 Constitution. The Turkish-Cypriot Leadership also claimed that the Cyprus Inland Revenue Department had failed to pay the Turkish-Cypriot Communal Chamber the Income Tax which the Department had collected, by delegation and on behalf of the Chamber, from members of the Turkish-Cypriot community for 1963. Turkish-Cypriot leaders further claimed that their community paid a large amount of indirect taxation (Customs and Excise Duties, Licensing Fees etc.) from which they were getting no benefits at all. The government for its part readily admitted that the Turkish-Cypriot community was paying indirect taxation but since records were not kept on a communal basis it was impossible to verify the amount of their contribution. In any case, the government declared that its records showed that any Turk-Cypriot credits were more than offset by their debts. However, the main reason why the government withheld funds from the Turkish-Cypriot community was that it did not intend to finance 'rebels' committed to the overthrow of the government.

Following the Tylliria battle, the Makarios government renewed its campaign to win support for its case in the United Nations. The Greek-Cypriot approach to the international community was that Cyprus, as a full member of the United Nations, was completely independent and must therefore not be subjected to threats of intervention by other states.

This approach was supported by the Soviet Union because it wanted to prevent an expansion of NATO influence in the Eastern Mediterranean. A Cyprus - U.S.S.R. Aid Agreement was signed on 30 September 1964.[23] Support was also forthcoming from non- aligned countries who viewed Cyprus as being the unwilling pawn of the neo-colonialist power struggle. On 10 October 1964, a declaration adopted by the "Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries", held at Cairo, called on all states to respect the sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus, and to refrain from intervening in Cypriot affairs.[24]

On 26 March 1965, Mr. Galo Plaza, the United Nations Mediator on Cyprus tabled his report.[25] His main recommendations were that: (1) Cyprus should remain an independent State and voluntarily renounce its right to choose union with Greece; (2) the island should be demilitarized with the question of the British sovereign bases being set aside for further consideration; (3) there should be no partition but Turkish-Cypriot rights should be guaranteed by the United Nations and supervised by a United Nations Commissioner in the island; (4) a settlement must be the outcome of talks between the communities in Cyprus; (5) the problem could not be resolved by attempting to restore the situation which existed before December 1963.

The report broadly supported the position of Greece and the Makarios government. Both accepted it as a basis for negotiations, although it was clear they would never voluntarily renounce enosis.[26]

The Turkish government and the Turkish-Cypriot Leadership rejected the report on the grounds that the Mediator had exceeded the terms of his mandate, to promote an agreed settlement, by setting out his personal observations and recommendations without first securing the agreement of all parties to the dispute.[27] This reasoning may have been technically correct, but there is little doubt that the Turkish government and the Turkish-Cypriot Leadership would have accepted the Mediator's report if it had been more sympathetic to their position. The resulting deadlock forced Plaza to resign his position on 22 December 1965, so that United Nations mediation might continue under another appointee. The Makarios government however refused to accept another mediator. It stated that if Turkey was permitted to force the mediator's resignation simply because his views were not to its liking, it would follow that the institution itself was under- mined and could no longer be relied upon to function objectively 28 and effectively. The Secretary-General, as an alternative, and with the consent of all affected parties, enlarged the functions of his special representative in Cyprus so as to have 29 quasi-mediational responsibilities.

On 18 December 1965, the Makarios government secured the adoption of a United Nations General Assembly resolution which appeared to support its claim for the unfettered independence of Cyprus, and to discount the Turkish claim to the right of 30. intervention based on the Zurich-London treaties of 1959.[30] It was, in fact, a restatement of the Cairo declaration of October 1964. The way had been prepared for this resolution by a declaration of minority rights, circulated in the United Nations by the Greek-Cypriot representatives, which followed very closely the recommendations of the Mediator's report. The Greek-Cypriot government had also given a great deal of publicity to its pro- posed plans for the rehabilitation of Turkish-Cypriot refugees, and the easing of the economic blockade against the Turkish- Cypriot community.

Greeks and Greek-Cypriots regarded the passing of this resolution as the most heartening political development in the Cyprus question since the creation of the Cyprus republic. Turks and Turk-Cypriots regarded the adoption of the resolution as the most serious foreign policy set-back for years. While Greek-Cypriot representatives lobbied for unfettered independence abroad, at home Greek-Cypriot leaders continued to assure their community that they were dedicated to enosis. This concurrent agitation for independence and union with Greece was not contradictory as far as the Makarios government was concerned. The international acceptance of unfettered Cypriot sovereignty was seen as the most effective means of preventing a Turkish intervention. The Cypriot people would then be free to exercise their right of political self-determination in a plebiscite which would arm President Makarios with a democratically achieved mandate to declare the union of Cyprus with Greece (i.e. in accordance with the Akritas Plan).

While the United Nations resolution of 18 December 1965 was greeted by Greek-Cypriots as a successful culmination of their diplomatic offensive, the voting record of that resolution suggests that their conclusion was overly optimistic.[31] The roll-call vote showed 47 states in favour, 5 opposed and 54 abstentions. Those in favour were largely non-aligned underdeveloped countries which could not offer any material support to the Greek-Cypriot cause. Those voting against the resolution were the United States, which was anxious to retain Turkey as a NATO ally; Albania, presumably because of its hostility to any expansionist plans of Greece; Turkey, and her two military allies, Iran and Pakistan.

It had become increasingly obvious to the Soviet Union by mid-1965 that Greek-Cypriot protestations about independence were in fact only part of a plan designed to achieve enosis, a by- product of which would undoubtedly be an expansion of NATO influence in the Eastern Mediterranean. Russia therefore withdrew much of its support from the Makarios government. Even before the Cyprus-U.S.S.R. Aid Agreement lapsed on 23 August 1965, the Soviet Union had assured Turkey that it supported the Turkish contention that the constitutional structure of Cyprus must be based on a partnership between the two communities, rather than on a majority-minority status. The Russians had also hinted that they would support a federal, independent Cyprus.[32]

Following the adoption of the General Assembly resolution on Cyprus in December 1965, Turkey and Turkish-Cypriot leaders launched their own diplomatic offensive to counter the Greek-Cypriot advantage. Firstly, they endeavoured to strengthen the accord which was already being developed between Turkey and Russia. Secondly, western support was enlisted by publicizing the fact that the largest Greek-Cypriot political party was communist (i.e. AKEL) and that the Turkish-Cypriot community should be supported to counter its influence. Turkey also emphasized that it was a more strategically important NATO partner than Greece. Thirdly, Turks and Turk-Cypriots sought to enlist support from Muslim countries on the basis of a common religious heritage and the Greek-Cypriot desecration of mosques. The National Guard unwittingly aided this campaign when it prevented Turk-Cypriots from visiting the Tekke of Hala Sultan near Larnaca and allowed this shrine to fall into disrepair. Finally, the Turkish and Turk-Cypriot representatives sought to convince non- aligned governments that the Greek and Greek-Cypriot aim was not to ensure the independence of Cyprus but rather to foster the expansion of a neo-colonialist Greece. By June 1966, seven of those states which had voted for the General Assembly resolution on Cyprus six months earlier had made declarations against interpreting their vote as supporting enosis.[33]

The Greek Army's coup on 21 April 1967 led to the diplomatic isolation of Greece, and to increased international opposition to any moves which would facilitate enosis. A priority of the Greek colonels' foreign policy programme was to improve Greek- Turkish relations. The Makarios government continued to maintain that the constitutional order in Cyprus must be negotiated by Cypriots themselves; nevertheless, it supported the opening of a Greek-Turk dialogue in September 1967 as a means of regaining the political initiative. A number of restrictions of the Turkish- Cypriot community were removed to facilitate these talks, and to support the Greek-Cypriot position during the October debates in the General Assembly. Turkish-Cypriots in Limassol and Paphos Districts were allowed to purchase items from the government's list of strategic materials. Hala Sultan Tekke was re-opened, a number of checkpoints were removed from main roads, and CYPOL searches of Turkish-Cypriots entering the Nicosia enclave were speeded up. A general amnesty was even offered to the Turkish- 34 Cypriot ' rebels'.[34]

In light of this apparent easing in inter-communal tensions, it may seem anomalous that by mid-November 1967 the National Guard had launched their largest offensive since the Kokkina battle of August 1964, and that an invasion of Cyprus by Turkey was imminent. Nevertheless, three years of diplomatic manoeuvring had done nothing to remove the cause of inter-communal tension: the Greek-Cypriot demand that all Cyprus must be politically united with Greece; the Turk-Cypriot determination that they and their land would not be included in such a union.

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