Richard A. Patrick, Political Geography and the Cyprus Conflict

Reader:  Only the first footnote and a line at the bottom of Chapter Four are linked to this page.

1. Refer to: Cyprus Mail 26 February 1966; 3,22,25,27 March 1966; 8,12 April 1966; 5,7,10,21 May 1966.

2. Refer to Cyprus Mail 7 May 1966.

3. Refer to United Nations S/7969, par. 27.

4. Refer to United Nations S/7611/Add.l; H.D. Purcell, 1969, p. 370.

5. Refer to Cyprus Mail 4,7 December 1966.

6. Refer to: United Nations S/7969, pars. 63-67; M. Harbottle, 1970, pp. 106-107.

7. These sources include confidential reports and interviews with officials of both Cypriot communities and neutral observers. Published sources include Reports by the United Nations Secretary General on the Situation in Cyprus, and accounts in the Cypriot press.

8. i.e. the Progressive Party of the Working People.

9. i.e. the Pancyprian Federation of Labour, popularly known as the "Old Trade Unions".

10. Refer to H.D. Purcell, 1969, p. 377.

11. Refer to H.S. Gibbons, 1969, p. 175.

12. Refer to United Nations S/6102, pars. 7-21, Annex 1.

13. This "strategic materials list" was modified from time to time, but generally it included: certain articles of clothing, building materials, cement, electrical equipment, batteries, timber, automotive accessories and parts, chemicals and large quantities of fuels.

14. Refer to United Nations S/6102, par. 42.

15. These figures have been compiled from statistics provided by the Statistics and Research Department of the Cyprus Government's Ministry of Finance, and by the Planning Department of the Provisional Turkish-Cypriot Administration.

16. United Nations S/7611, par. 122.

17. This was verified in interviews with officials of the Provisional Turkish-Cypriot Administration.

18. This section is based on the agricultural reports contained in the United Nations Secretary General's Reports on Cyprus.

19. United Nations S/7611, par. 132.

20. ibid.; Republic of Cyprus, Report by the Special Parliamentary Committee set up to Examine the Question of Emergency Victims (.Nicosia: House of Representatives, 13 April 1967).

21. This section is based on relevant reports contained in the United Nations Secretary General's Report on Cyprus.

22. ibid.

23. Refer to: Cyprus Mail I October 1964; H.D. Purcell, 1969, p. 355.

24. H.D. Purcell, 1969, p. 356.

25. Refer to: United Nations S/6253 (i.e. Report of the United Nations Mediator on Cyprus to the Secretary-General).

26. The Cyprus Government's reply is contained in S/6275/Add.l; Greece's response is in S/6280.

27. The text of the reply of the Turkish Government is to be found in S/6267 and S/6267/Add. 1; that of the Turk-Cypriot Leadership is in S/6279.

28. Refer to: Republic of Cyprus, Cyprus: The Problem in Perspective Public Information Office, Nicosia: Revised June 1969, p. 26.

29. Refer to United Nations S/7180.

30. The text and voting record of this resolution, and the declaration of minority rights is contained in: Republic of Cyprus, Cyprus: The Problem in Perspective, Public Information Office, Nicosia: Revised June 1969, pp. 44-52.

31. ibid.

32. In December 1964, a French news agency quoted the Russian ambassador to Turkey as saying that Russia never did sup- port, nor would it support, the union of Cyprus with Greece (Cyprus Mail 22 December 1964). In January 1965, the Soviet Foreign Minister, Gromyko, in an lzvestia article, indicated that Russia would support a federal solution (Cyprus Mail 21 January 1965). In August 1965, the Turkish Prime Minister visited Moscow, the first such visit for 30 years. The communique at the end of the visit declared that the Cyprus solution must be based on the observance of the lawful rights of both national communities in Cyprus (Cyprus Mail 16 August 1965). Refer also to Special News, nos. 575-584.

33. i.e. Nepal, Uruguay, the Lebanon, Syria, Gabon, Ethiopia, and Ghana.

34. Refer to: H.D. Purcell, 1969, pp. 378-379; Cyprus Bulletin vol. 4, nos. 25-30; United Nations S/8286, pars. 90-96.

35. Official casualty figures were supplied to the author by the Social Affairs Department of the Provisional Turkish-Cypriot Administration, the Criminal Investigation Department of the Cyprus Police, the Ministry of Interior of the Cyprus Government and the United Nations Civilian Police Headquarters of the United Nations Force in Cyprus. An analysis of the circumstances of these deaths and abductions was based on 'official' publications put out by the Information Agencies of both communities, accounts in the Cypriot press, United Nations Secretary-General's Reports, and on extensive confidential field interviews throughout Cyprus.

36. This account is based on confidential interviews and on reports in: United Nations S/7611, par. 96; S/7969, par. 90. It should be noted that, since 21 December 1963, there is only one known instance where a person was imprisoned by his own community for killing a member of the other community. In that case, a Greek-Cypriot was sentenced to four years imprisonment on 17 January 1968, but was released from custody on 18 April 1969 as an executive act of clemency. At the same time, four other Greek-Cypriots and three Turk-Cypriots were also freed by the government, thus releasing all persons arrested for offences connected with the 'emergency' (United Nations S/8622, par. 47).

37.Events here were confirmed by field interviews. Refer also to United Nations S/7969, par. 83.

38. ibid.

39. ibid.

40. Refer to United Nations S/8286, pars. 69-70. Local interviews were also undertaken in this village about these events.

41. Refer to: United Nations S/7611, pars. 57-61; M. Harbottle, 1970, pp. 91-94.

42. The events of this vendetta are based on local interviews and on accounts in: United Nations S/8286, pars. 62-66, 76-77; M. Harbottle, 1970, pp. 112-120.

43. These military figures are based on United Nations estimate published in the Secretary-General's reports during this period.

44. Secretary-General's reports during this period indicate the extent of the accidental shooting incidents:

Time period covered                 Total Cease-Fire Breaches        Deliberate Cease-fire Breaches
[day.mo.yr]

9.6.64 -8.9.64                                       259                                        no figures given

9.9.64 - 8.12.64                                    160                                              22

9.12.64 - 7.3.65                                    222                                        no figures given

8.3.65 - 10.6.65                                    259                                        no figures given

11.6.65 - 1.12.65                                    69                                              22          

2.12.65 - 7.3.66                                      17                                                7

8.3.66 - 7.6.66                                        34                                               22

8.6.66 - 5.12.66                                    289                                               54

6.12.66 - 6.6.67                                    346                                               23

7.6.67 - 6.12.67                                    284                                               22

45. Refer to: United Nations S/7001, pars. 79-85; S/7191, pars. 61-62; S/7350, pars. 64-65.

46. Refer to: United Nations S/6426, pars. 80-83; S/7350, pars. 49-54; S/7418; M. Harbottle, 1970, pp.61, 78-82. Other examples can be noted at Lefka, in March 1965 (S/6228/Add,1; S/6426, pars. 72-75).

47. The account of events at Mora is based on: United Nations S/7611, pars. 49-50; M. Harbottle, 1970, pp. 75-78, 82-83.

48. The account of events at Melousha is based on: United Nations S/7611, pars. 51-55, 89; M.» Harbottle, 1970, pp. 82-91.

49. Refer to: United Nations S/6426, pars. 84-89; S/7191, par. 42; S/8286, pars. 56-61; M. Harbottle, 1970, p. 108.

50. Refer to: United Nations S/7350, pars. 39-41. National Guard coastal defence positions were established adjacent to Temblos, and barbed wire fences were set up, hemming the village in on three sides.

51. National Guard defences along Morphou Bay prevented the villagers of Ghaziveran from having access to some of their fields and to the nearby beaches, their source of sand and gravel for building. The Greek-Cypriot garrison at Xeros, was assigned to coastal defence duties, but equally it was used to maintain pickets around Lefka.

52. Coastal defences were constructed south and west of the Turkish-Cypriot quarter of Scala in Larnaca. Refer to United Nations S/7350, pars. 31-38; M. Harbottle, 1970, pp. 60-61.

53. Refer to United Nations S/6228, pars. 71-76; S/6881/Adds.l & 2; S/7001, pars. 55-56; M. Harbottle, 1970, pp. 58-60.

54. This figure is based on UNFICYP estimates reported in the Secretary-General's reports of this period.

55. The events leading up to the National Guard attack of 15 November 1967, are based on extensive local interviews and on accounts contained in: United Nations S/7969, pars. 49-60; S/8248; S/8248/Adds. 1-9; M. Harbottle, 1970, pp. 96-111, 145-167.

56. In the weeks following the attack, it was rumoured in Cyprus that the Greek Minister of Defence, General Spandidakis, had cabled the assault orders to Grivas. The rumour was strengthened by Spandidakis' removal from his post within a few days after the attack. Further credence was added to this suggestion by an article in the Daily Telegraph of 13 March 1970 (i.e. "A Redundant General and the Temporary President") in which the reporter, having interviewed both Grivas and Makarios, confirmed that the Greek Minister of Defence had ordered the attack. It will be recalled that the Greek Army in Cyprus had moved from its camps the day before the attack as a defensive measure against Turkish air-raids. In addition, Grivas' senior staff officers were Greek Army officers, and some of them had direct access to the Greek Defence Ministry. Therefore, it can be reasonably assumed that Spandidakis had at least some knowledge of what was about to happen even if he did not actually draft the executive order to attack the villages. Nevertheless, it may have been that Grivas misrepresented the facts of the Ayios Theodhoros situation to Spandidakis, and that he, like Makarios, was mistaken in believing that Grivas would use the minimum necessary force.