In the meantime, radical Islamist opinion has nursed mounting grievances over the nature of Al Saud rule and the government's close relationship with the US. Declining living standards, alleged corruption within the Al Saud, starkly uneven distribution of wealth and growing urbanisation have compounded the already strong resentment among younger Islamists. Angry demonstrations took place in 1994, including within the Nejd, the heartland of Wahhabi power and traditional bedrock of Al Saud support. These were spearheaded by the re-emergence of the Sahwa (Islamic awakening) trend that had first appeared in the 1960s. In stark contrast to the establishment clergy, the younger generation of Sahwa clerics have directly criticised—and challenged the legitimacy of—Al Saud rule. Sahwa thinking is based on radical Sunni Islamist ideas of the salafi kind, typified by support for an ultra-puritanical and "universalist" version of Islam, which seeks the restoration of a caliphate. Some of the Sahwa clerics have also been influenced by the thinking of Sayyed Qutb, the Egyptian writer who inspired the Muslim Brotherhood.

Some of the country's Islamist opposition groups have advocated violent resistance against the Al Saud and, in particular, US interests in the country, and the 1990s saw a number of bomb attacks that resulted in the death of US servicemen. As the antipathy of militant Islamists towards foreign interests in the country deepened, the scope of their targets widened and they were responsible for a spate of small-scale bomb attacks between 2000 and 2003 that killed and injured individual Westerners working in the kingdom. The Saudi authorities initially blamed most of the attacks on disputes among expatriates over the illegal trade in alcohol, and convicted five Westerners for the bombings. However, following the September 11th 2001 attacks on the US, in which the majority of perpetrators were found to be Saudi nationals, the regime finally started to acknowledge that they were facing a serious home-grown problem. As crown prince, King Abdullah attempted to draw upon his personal good standing among the ulema by appealing to them to restrain extremist messages from outspoken young clerics who were threatening the wider interests of the religious establishment. However, extreme militancy had already taken hold among more radical Islamist figures, who, in 2003, began a concerted bombing campaign of expatriate residential compounds.

The government responded forcefully to the continued Islamist-inspired violence, which has gradually waned, with the security forces having seemingly gained the upper hand. A wide-ranging ideological campaign by the authorities has also played a role in reducing public support for Islamist violence within the kingdom. Moreover, some of the leading Sahwa clerics have themselves denounced violent attacks within the kingdom and have backed government amnesties for militants.

However, although their traditional approach was repression, it would appear that the authorities are now taking a more conciliatory line towards the Shia community. The formation of the National Dialogue in 2003 drew in the senior Shia religious leadership and, unprecedentedly, saw Sunni Islamist radicals engaging with them. Further attempts to accommodate the Shia occurred with the formation of a Qatif municipal authority just prior to the local elections in 2005, which saw an all-Shia slate elected there. In 2005 the kingdom also hosted a conference of Sunni and Shia clerics who prepared a joint statement condemning sectarian bloodshed in Iraq, known as the Mecca Declaration. However, the authorities remain wary of the Shia and some of the country's most influential clerics still regard Shia Islam as a form of heresy. With the growing confidence of the Shia community around the Middle East, inspired by both Iranian defiance of the West and Iraqi Shia resurgence, the Saudi government may move to clamp down on them once more. For their part, younger Shia activists are impatient with the cautious approach of Sheikh Hassan Saffar, the leading Shia cleric, and in time there could be frustration if the current political openings do not alter their community's unequal status in the kingdom.

In 2006, in an attempt to reduce the likelihood of conflicts within the family over the succession, King Abdullah formed a new council of senior princes to determine the future line of succession. This institution, known as the Allegiance Council, formalises a process of consultation within the family over the appointment of future crown princes (although some consultation has always been assumed to take place in practice, and it is likely that leading clerics will also be informally consulted). At the same time, it has relieved the immediate pressure on the king to choose the third in line to the throne. When King Abdullah came to power in 2005, and the then second deputy prime minister, Prince Sultan, became crown prince, it was widely expected that the king would name another of the sons of King Abdel-Aziz as the new second deputy prime minister. Since the reign of King Khaled (1975-82), the occupant of this position has acceded to the throne after the heir-apparent. For now, the post remains vacant. The eventual appointee is highly likely to be one of the prominent Sudairis and will probably be either Prince Nayef, the interior minister, or Prince Salman, the governor of Riyadh. Prince Nayef is the more senior of the two candidates, but in policy terms the king is closer to Prince Salman. However, favouring either of these influential candidates could potentially upset the various princes, officials and businesspeople within their circles of patronage, and thereby cause tensions within the family. This probably explains why the king has avoided making the decision so far. The Allegiance Council law stipulates only that a new crown prince must be appointed within 30 days of the accession of a new king.

Another interesting aspect of the new Council is that, at least in theory, it would be able to remove a king if he is judged by a medical committee to permanently incapacitated. King Abdullah has first-hand experience of such a situation, having acted as a virtual regent for King Fahd for several years while the latter was ill towards the end of his rein. Such a scenario could easily arise again as the crown passes between the ageing sons of King Abdel-Aziz.