

# STAYING THE COURSE: PERMANENT U.S. BASES IN IRAQ?

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Over the last few years, some reports concerning the question of "permanent" U.S. bases in Iraq have appeared in the U.S. press, mostly in its left-of-center or alternative political spectrum but also in some mainstream papers. These reports, which on occasion have been officially refuted, did not trigger any major political debate in the American public, perhaps with the notable exception of former Senator Gary Hart, who regularly raises this issue.<sup>1</sup> Yet up to 80 percent of the Iraqi public is convinced that the United States does plan permanent bases in the country.<sup>2</sup> And there are other good reasons for believing that the United States intends to establish future bases in Iraq. One was provided by former senior political advisor to the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Larry C. Diamond. At a public conference<sup>3</sup> he bluntly announced, "We are building permanent bases in Iraq." Another is the Congressional Research Service's (CRS) rather matter-of-fact statement, "It is now believed that continued deployment of substantial military ground forces [in Iraq] could be necessary for several years."<sup>4</sup> Finally, President Bush himself suggests that the United States will certainly remain past the year 2008 and that the stay of U.S. troops in the country "will be decided

by future presidents and future governments of Iraq."<sup>5</sup> These statements can be substantiated by official documents. There is a presidential appropriations bill for 2005 that asks for emergency funding.<sup>6</sup> Under the heading "Military Construction: Army," it explains military construction projects in support of the troops in Iraq and Afghanistan:

This proposal will allow the Army to provide temporary facilities, *and in some very limited cases, permanent facilities* required to station these BCT(UA)s [Brigade Combat Teams - Units of Action]. These facilities include barracks, administrative space, vehicle maintenance facilities, aviation facilities, mobilization-demobilization barracks, and community support facilities (*italics added*).

In its report to the bill "Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005" (H.R. 1268),<sup>7</sup> the Committee on Appropriations meticulously raised the question of permanency:

Given the expeditionary nature of our Nation's efforts in Southwest Asia, [i.e., Iraq and Afghanistan]<sup>8</sup> the Committee would expect temporary

facilities to be the rule rather than the exception. The Committee recognizes that *some facilities may support longer-term plans for an enduring presence in the region* [...]. The nature of the United States' long-term presence in the region remains largely *undecided* and should be determined before extensive investments in permanent facilities are made (italics added).

In other words, without any formal decision having been taken on the political level, the administration is investing in some facilities in Iraq that are not temporary. Semantics play an important role here, as American law makers have shifted from the term "permanent" to the term "enduring." This is in line with a general policy, as law makers publicly protest against "permanent" bases but remain silent about "enduring" ones.<sup>9</sup> This logic is a result of the security situation in Iraq. Who, by any standard, could object to the construction of Concrete Masonry Units (CMUs) for U.S. barracks in Iraq, when U.S. troops are daily subjected to mortar fire and CMUs would ensure their safety? In the end, it is a moot point whether these facilities become permanent by default or by design. This does not mean that the United States will not leave Iraq at some future date, but it will certainly leave some "footprint" in Iraq. The scale and scope of the investments on the ground are therefore indicators of the nature of this footprint. Another indicator will be the number of troops remaining.

### **TROOP DRAWDOWN**

Senior U.S. officials including the secretary of defense have said publicly that the United States would not seek perma-

nent military bases in Iraq but rather would draw down troops "significantly" over the year 2006 — provided, of course, "the security situation allows."<sup>10</sup> Statements like these echo the spirit, if not the language, of Senator John Kerry's "Strategy for Success in Iraq Act (S 1993 IS, 109th CONGRESS, 1st Session)"<sup>11</sup> of November 10, 2005, in which he insisted that such a commitment be publicly made. Recent debate<sup>12</sup> indicates that the administration has defined the Iraqi army's capability to fight the insurgency as an indicator that the United States could leave Iraq.<sup>13</sup>

Discussion of the proper exit strategy is far from over.<sup>14</sup> Currently, U.S. law makers are discussing a wide range of options, from troop increases to immediate withdrawal. The approximately 50-member Out of Iraq Congressional Caucus headed by Representative John Murtha (D-PA.) supports the latter option. Others, like Senator Russell Feingold (D-WI), favor a clear withdrawal timetable, citing the end of 2006 as a possible starting date. Consensus, however, has been reached that "the year 2006 should be a period of significant transition to full Iraqi sovereignty." And the president announced a small drawdown to about 135,000 troops at the beginning of 2006. There are also plans for a substantial drawdown down to 40,000-50,000 troops, according to military officials.<sup>15</sup> This would be in line with Senator Kerry's plea for a drawdown of "at least" 100,000 troops. Given the numbers of December 2005, this would be about 60,000 troops less.

Thus, bringing troops home does not mean bringing all troops home. According to *The New Yorker* of December 5, 2005, there are discussions about pulling out all combat troops by summer 2008.<sup>16</sup> However, there

will be a certain number — perhaps the abovementioned 50,000 — left behind, depending on the situation on the ground. A total retreat over the next few years is, thus, by all accounts unlikely. This is all the more the case since, as we have seen, only a small group of law makers is in favor of total withdrawal from Iraq. A majority is obviously in line with the administration's policy to reduce troops over the year 2006 provided the security situation does not deteriorate. It is therefore safe to conclude that the debate about "withdrawal" is in reality about troop reduction in Iraq and a concession to public opinion in both the United States and Iraq. The language of Senator Kerry's Strategy for Success in Iraq Act<sup>17</sup> vindicates this conclusion, as letter (1) C in Section 4 reads,

Reduce the sense of United States occupation of Iraq by ... reducing the visibility of United States forces by placing as many as possible in rear guard, garrisoned status for security backup purposes.

Of course, with a majority of the Iraqis vociferously opposed to the presence of U.S. troops in their country, Larry Diamond is correct to point out the fact that the ongoing presence of U.S. troops is one major motivation for the insurgency. Reducing troops and getting the remaining ones out of sight is therefore a logical option, although it would certainly be no guarantee that the insurgency would abate. It appears that the U.S. envisages three

simultaneous phases: drawdown of troops, training of the Iraqi army and retreat to bases. In any case, the United States will need bases of some kind in Iraq for a long period.

### STRATEGIC ACCESSIBILITY

As early as April 2003, a senior administration official mentioned a long-term relationship with the Iraqi government that "would grant the Pentagon access to military bases and project American influence throughout the region."<sup>18</sup> Similar statements were made in the context of the handover of sovereignty in June 2004.<sup>19</sup> There was even

some speculation as to whether the future Iraqi bases could become a "swap" for Saudi or even Turkish bases.<sup>20</sup> Needless to say, accessibility to bases was always envisaged by the United States and is in line with

the National Defense Strategy (NDS) of September 2002 and even more so with NDS 2005, where "Projecting and Maintaining Forces in Anti-Access Environments" is defined as a key operational capability (NDS 2005, III [A] 4). President Bush himself has defined Iraq (and to a lesser degree Afghanistan) as the frontline for waging the Global War on Terror (GWOT). Therefore, the Report on the U.S. Global Posture<sup>21</sup> is formulated as follows:

Cooperation and access provided by host nations during operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom provide us with a solid basis for long-term, cooperative relationships in this

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region. We seek to maintain or upgrade, and in some cases establish, forward operating sites and cooperative security locations for rotational and contingency purposes, along with strategically placed prepositioned equipment and forward command and control elements.

Hence, bases in Iraq are essential for the envisioned "long-term cooperative relationship." The United States therefore

...desire[s] close sustained security relationships with Afghanistan and Iraq that enable it... to continue to play a positive role in their rebuilding efforts and in regional security broadly. As with all such relationships, any decision on future U.S. military posture is a sovereign choice for their people and governments.<sup>22</sup>

Yet the question of bases immediately became an issue of major controversy between the United States and the Iraqis during the draft sessions for the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL)<sup>23</sup> and remains unresolved to this day. There is not even a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between the United States and Iraq. Thomas Donnelly of the American Enterprise Institute correctly pointed out that the weak government of Ayad Allawi was in no position to sign any legally binding document that could regulate the presence of U.S. troops in Iraq.<sup>24</sup> But his conclusion that a legitimately elected Iraqi government would be "able and ready to do so" was pure wishful thinking. The opposite came true as democratically elected Prime Minister Ibrahim Jaafari signed a pact of cooperation on security issues with the Islamic Republic of Iran. And even if the United States succeeded in preventing this

pact from being implemented, it can only be seen as directed against U.S. interests.<sup>25</sup> Given the worsening crisis between the Shia bloc in the Iraqi Parliament and the United States over the reappointment of Jaafari as prime minister, it is hard to imagine that there will be an Iraqi government ready to sign any agreement over the status of American troops with the United States. But without a SOFA, U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1511 and 1546<sup>26</sup> remain the only legal basis for the presence of U.S. troops in Iraq. In this context, one has to raise the question whether the United States has, while lacking a SOFA, any right at all to detain Iraqi citizens, since Article 21 of the Iraqi Constitution, which was approved by referendum in October 2005, clearly denies foreign entities and authorities such a right.

### **WHAT KIND OF BASES, HOW MANY AND WHERE?**

*GlobalSecurity.org* has identified more than 100 U.S. and Coalition bases in Iraq, reaching from small outposts to giant facilities like Balad or Al-Asad airfield. Some of them are virtual American cities able to house up to 25,000 troops.<sup>27</sup> The same source quotes reports that the United States plans to retreat to a smaller number of huge compounds scattered over the country. Back in 2003, there were various press reports of about four "permanent bases." Later reports indicated a total of about 14 bases,<sup>28</sup> but subsequent reporting in 2005 and 2006 again suggests three or four. It appears that, in May 2005, a major overhaul of U.S. basing in Iraq got under way: according to *The Washington Post*,<sup>29</sup> the military already had a precise plan for closing down and handing over many bases to the Iraqis. This is especially true of

Saddam Hussein's palaces. U.S. commanders discovered to their cost that living in these elaborate compounds did tremendous damage to their image in the eyes of the Iraqi population. Some bases, however, are said to have been chosen to enable U.S. forces to maintain a foothold in various regions of Iraq.

Needless to say, nowhere in accessible sources at the Department of Defense, the U.S. Army or the U.S. Air Force could we retrieve any document that would disclose the number and location of all U.S. bases in Iraq, let alone a list of those designed to become "permanent." As there is no official statement available concerning permanent bases in Iraq, any list of permanent U.S. bases can only be a "guesstimate," to use Anthony Cordesman's term. However, various press reports together with published data from the Department of Defense<sup>30</sup> identify roughly a dozen locations (see the table "Overview of U.S. Bases in Iraq" at the end). Among them, a lower number could qualify as permanent bases in the sense of the *FY 2005 Supplemental Request*.

### WHAT KINDS OF BASES?

One problem in correctly defining the nature of bases in Iraq is the sometimes misleading use of military terminology like "camp," "base," "facility," "airfield" and the like in open sources. Also, one location might include more than one "camp" or "base." Bradley Graham thinks the new bases had originally been referred to as "enduring," but the term was changed to "contingency operating bases" in February 2005.<sup>31</sup> *GlobalSecurity.org* identifies most bases as either "camps" or "FOB," leaving undefined whether they were Forward Operating or Forward Operations

Bases. Yet a look into U.S. manuals and official definitions does not necessarily dispel confusion. If one follows JP 3-05.1, the standard U.S. manual of Special Operations,<sup>32</sup> one might opt for "forward operations base" (FOB), which provides support for training and tactical operations but remains controlled or supported by a main operations base. This certainly holds true for most of the U.S. bases in Iraq, but not for the so-called "super bases," which have the defining characteristics of a Main Operations Base (MOB) in the sense of JP 3-05.1. These would be able to "provide sustained command and control, administration, and logistical support to special operations activities." It goes without saying that this definition must be seen from the operational/tactical level. As seen from a strategic point of view as formulated in the 2004 Global Defense Posture, it remains doubtful whether any base would qualify for a Main Operating (*sic*) Base (MOB)<sup>33</sup> like Ramstein Air Base in Germany or Kadena Air Base in Japan, although bases 1-3 on our "Tentative List of U.S. Bases" in Iraq (see below) have almost all the necessary structures for MOB according to the 2004 Defense Posture, with the notable exception of family facilities.

In order to dispel this confusion, the "Overview of U.S. Bases in Iraq" gives an indication of what authors have identified as bases of a permanent kind. The "Tentative List of U.S. Bases" cited below includes only those bases

- where the size and quality of investment is big enough to lead to the conclusion that a certain durability of the facility is envisaged and
- where there is a high likelihood that they are bases from which military operations will be conducted.

We have therefore excluded facilities like the Muthanna Bunkers, the Taqaddum Tower, the facilities in Diwaniyyah and the one near Fallujah, all of which are cited in the Overview. Hence, as the following list shows, there is some consensus about a number of bases. The bases listed as 1 - 11 have in varying degrees three main characteristics in common:

- they are within a certain distance of main population centers;
- they are close to critical military infrastructures like airfields;
- they are close to strategic civilian infrastructures like refineries.

Having said this, we conclude that bases 1-3 are main operations bases and 5-11 forward operations bases according to JP 3-05.1. Interestingly, almost all bases are located in the Arab region of the country, with only Kirkuk (number 8) and perhaps Bashur/Harir (number 10) being in the Kurdish region. Only Tallil (number 3) is in the Shiite region. All others (numbers 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 9, 11) are in the Arab-Sunni region of Iraq. Also, all of them, with the exception of the embassy (number 4), are around airfields (numbers 1-5, 7-11), and some are close to critical petroleum facilities (1, 8, 11). In other words, as concerns U.S. basing, there is no sign of a retreat to Kurdistan or the Kurdish-dominated region.

The Tentative List indicates that numbers 1-3 are by far the most important bases; if press reports about a number of three or four "superbases" have any credibility, then we would argue that these bases would be Al-Asad, Balad and Tallil. To complete the list, one has to add the U.S. embassy in Baghdad as a permanent base. Balad's role should even increase when Baghdad International Airport is

returned to the Iraqis. The future of Camp Victory, the base near Baghdad Airport, seems to be under discussion; Balad might become an alternative to it too. Tallil would be a major logistical hub for the south. Kirkuk could become of similar importance to Tallil as a logistical hub of the north. After the projected handover of the U.S. facilities in Mosul airport, the importance of Qayyarah will only increase; it could even serve as a replacement for Mosul. The last bases in Mosul, Taji and Tikrit, are, it would seem, less important. However, Taji is important as a training facility for the Iraqi army. One interesting point emerges that is missing in most reporting: Bashur and H3 (often confused with H1, which is close to Al-Asad) are both locations that played a central role at the beginning of the war in 2003. H3 was infiltrated by Special Forces, and Bashur was taken by the 173 Airborne brigade. Both have the undeniable advantage of being situated in remote areas close to countries hostile to the United States: H3 is close to the Syrian border; Bashur (on the maps it appears mostly as Harir), north of Shaqlawa, is close to Iran. In our view, it is very likely that both airfields are the two "Classified Locations" referenced in the *FY 2004 Supplemental Request*.

#### **TENTATIVE LIST OF U.S. BASES**

- 1) **Balad**, north of Baghdad and right in the heart of Sunni-dominated, populous central Iraq.<sup>34</sup> The airfield and an oil refinery are important infrastructures. Balad Airbase and Army Camp Anaconda are said to house more than 20,000 troops. Camp Anaconda includes at least battalion and company headquarters and a hospital facility.<sup>35</sup> The airbase is said to be one of the biggest in Iraq and should in the

- medium term replace Camp Victory at Baghdad International Airport. Its facilities include a special-operations compound (CJSOTF Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force), a cargo/marshalling area, hot cargo pad and a CSAR/JSOAD/MEDEVAC alert compound.
- 2) **Al-Asad** should be Ayn Al-Asad in the desert in Western Iraq, near the historic site of Al-Qadisiyah.<sup>36</sup> Engelhardt's assumption might be right that it replaces H1, as it is in the same area as this remote outpost but closer to the Euphrates.<sup>37</sup> It is the second largest airfield in Iraq and includes two Forward Operating Bases, according to *Globalsecurity.org*. The Department of Defense requested funds for airfield improvement, electrical distribution and a generation station.
  - 3) **Tallil** is close to the ancient site of Ur, 20 km from Nasiriyah, which is on the other side of the Euphrates River. The base includes Camps Cedar I and Cedar II and Camp Adder. Camp Cedar III in Nasiriyah belongs to Tallil. It is located near a weapons storage area and an old dysfunctional Iraqi airport that has been rebuilt. For 2006, funds for the upgrading of the base-perimeter security fence, a convoy support center, a dining facility and road building have been requested.
  - 4) **Baghdad embassy**: The U.S. embassy will remain in the Green Zone and consist of at least 21 buildings. It will be independent from Baghdad, with its own power plant and sewage system. The embassy compound will also house a U.S. Marine Corps barracks. It will be the largest and most expensive embassy ever built.<sup>38</sup>
  - 5) **Taji** Airfield and Camp Taji are situated at the giant Republican Guard compound in the town of Taji, approximately 30 km north of Baghdad. It is designed as the main training camp for the Iraqi army.
  - 6) **Qayyarah**,<sup>39</sup> about 300 km north of Baghdad on the banks of the Tigris, could also be the base *The Chicago Tribune* has identified as being "between Irbil and Kirkuk." Such a description would indicate somewhere in the Kurdish region, but there are, to our knowledge, no noteworthy airfields in this area. Qayyarah has the potential to be a major supply point in the northern region of Iraq.
  - 7) **Mosul** Airfield and Camp Marez are home to a combat-support hospital and a troop medical clinic. According to the FY 2005 Supplemental Request, Mosul Airfield will be handed over to the Iraqis during 2006.
  - 8) **Kirkuk** Airbase and Camp Warrior are between the city of Kirkuk and Erbil in northern Iraq and close to the Kirkuk oil fields and refinery. Kirkuk is, according to *Globalsecurity.org*, a key element in the coalition effort to reconstruct Iraq. It also serves as a logistical hub for U.S. Army and Special Operations forces and provides civil-aviation traffic control for all of northern Iraq. In 2005, the army requested funds for a medical facility and a tactical-operations center.
  - 9) **Tikrit** is 100 miles northwest of Baghdad on the Tigris. According to ARNEWS, Forward Operating Base Speicher, opened in August 2005, "is the largest structure built in Iraq to date." It includes, among other structures, division headquarters for the 101

Airborne Division.<sup>40</sup>

- 10) **Bashur** (Harir on some maps) is north of Shaqlawa, 50 km northeast of Erbil. Bashur was a small civilian airport without any infrastructure. It was taken by the 173 Airborne Brigade in March 2003 and played a central role as an endpoint of the air routes from Ramstein via Constanca (Romania) to Bashur. *Globalsecurity.org* also mentioned training activity for the 319th Airborne Field Artillery Regiment on key tasks needed in further operations in the region.
- 11) **H3** near Ar-Rutbah in the far west of the country is close to the Syrian and Jordanian borders. H3, also Al-Walid Airbase, consists of three dispersal airfields, the main field being on the old oil-pumping station and on the highway that connects Jordan with Baghdad. According to the reference page at *Globalsecurity.org*, H3 is host to "Camp Korean Village (Camp KV)" run by the U.S. Marines, who help the Iraqis to operate checkpoints along the border. According to unconfirmed sources, it also contains a detention facility.

### IRAQI CONTINGENCIES

These bases could ensure a low-profile presence for the United States, strong enough to enable it to conduct contingency operations like raids and strikes (as foreseen in the NDS 2005), therefore reinforcing U.S. influence in the country.<sup>41</sup> These bases would be ideally suited to this posture. It has already been mentioned that they are all at a distance from heavily populated areas, are centered around airfields and hold a brigade-size combat team with an aviation unit and other

support personnel as indicated by the language of the *FY 2005 Supplemental Request*. In time, these strongholds should be used by Iraqi troops too, as is already the case with Taji base. Barracks and office structures are built in durable concrete, replacing the thin-skinned metal trailers, and concrete buildings are, of course, resistant to mortar fire. There is tremendous investment in perimeter security installations like fences, electronic surveillance systems, moats, no-go areas, checkpoints and the like. At the same time, a generous road-building program should ensure the independence of U.S. supply routes from the civilian road grid. For example, \$36 million was requested for the construction of Main Supply Route (MSR) Aspen, from the Kuwaiti border up to MSR Tampa in FY 2005.<sup>42</sup> An additional \$167 million was requested for urban bypass routes as a part of counter-IED operations a year later.<sup>43</sup> Iraqi insurgents will find it increasingly difficult to come close to, let alone attack, these strongholds, as the effects of one of their strongest weapons, the mortar, will be rendered useless. It is perhaps premature to judge whether the recent decline of attacks on U.S. troops — which was offset by an increase in attacks on civilians, especially businessmen — can be attributed to success in counterinsurgency and increased safety provided by hardened bases and by-pass routes.<sup>44</sup>

As seen from this angle, i.e., that U.S. troops are relatively safe in their compounds, it makes perfect sense that Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld told the House Appropriations Committee that Iraqi forces alone would be called upon to deal with any intercommunal unrest, but no U.S. troops.<sup>45</sup> If this is the case, then the



United States might stay in Iraq with a limited force as appropriate even in the event of a civil war.

Finally, one must not ignore the fact that at least some scholars and analysts define the new posture of U.S. troops in Iraq as part of a greater drift eastward. In their view, the bases in Iraq are just one side of a huge, newly emerging triangle consisting of the new bases in Afghanistan (like the huge Baghram air base but also other facilities in the west of the country) and the bases in the Persian Gulf, helping the United States to "deter" or to "contain" a nuclear Iran.<sup>46</sup>

These allegations were vindicated in March 2006, when General Abizaid told a subcommittee of the House of Representa-

tives that the United States is planning extensive basing in Iraq in order to secure the flow of oil and assert U.S. and allied interests in this oil-rich region, to support moderates against extremists and to "deter ambitions of an expansionistic Iran."<sup>47</sup> Seen from this perspective, the U.S.-Shia confrontation over the reappointment of Ibrahim Jaafari becomes understandable. Jaafari had guaranteed the Iranians that he would not allow any aggression emanating from Iraqi soil. Therefore, as long as he or some kindred spirit were in power, the United States would find it hard to get the consent, let alone support, of any Iraqi government if it deems it necessary to use U.S. bases in Iraq for contingency operations elsewhere.

### U.S. Bases in Iraq

	<i>2003 The New York Times</i>	<i>2004 The Chicago Tribune</i>	<i>2004 Supplemental Request</i>	<i>2005 The Washington Post</i>	<i>2005 Supplemental Request</i>	<i>2005 GlobalSecurity</i>	<i>2006 The Los Angeles Times</i>	<i>2006 Supplemental Request</i>
<b>Al-Asad</b>				"enduring base" "contingency operating base"		"contingency operation base"	Army Air Base 46.3* 17,000 Troops	Army 30 Airfield Improvements 8.9 Electrical Distribution, Generation Station 7.4 Force Protection, Antiterrorism Air Force 5.8 Material Handling Equipment Road
<b>Baghdad</b>	"base at airport"	"base"				"enduring bases:" Green Zone, Airfield		
<b>Balad</b>			Air Force 18 Airlift Ramp	"enduring base" "contingency operating base"	Army 39 Hospital, Logistics support Area 7.8 Combined Battalion & Company HQ Aviation 17.1 Equipment Support Facility Air Force 8 Alert Compound 2.7 Munitions Road 15 Airfield Lightning* 3.5 Hot Cargo Pad 15 Cargo Marshalling Area 2.85 Special Operations Compound	"enduring base" Contingency Operating Base	Air Base 228.7 (pending in 2005) 17.8 22,500 troops	Army 12 Perimeter Security Logistics Support Area, Anaconda Air Base 5.8 Material Handling Equipment Road
<b>Bashur</b>	Air Force Base							
<b>Classified Location</b>			Army 17.5 Two Aircraft Aprons					
<b>Diwaniyyah</b>					Army Camp Hope 2.5 CMU			

**U.S. Bases in Iraq (cont.)**

	<i>2003 The New York Times</i>	<i>2004 The Chicago Tribune</i>	<i>2004 Supplemental Request</i>	<i>2005 The Washington Post</i>	<i>2005 Supplemental Request</i>	<i>2005 Global-security</i>	<i>2006 The Los Angeles Times</i>	<i>2006 Supplemental Request</i>
<b>Erbil</b>		"base between Erbil and Kirkuk"		"base" alternative: Qayyarah				
<b>Fallujah</b>		"near Fallujah"				"enduring base" Fallujah Area		
<b>H1</b>	Special Forces							
<b>H3</b>						USMC Camp Korean Village Detention Facility		
<b>Al-Kasik</b>							150 Iraqi base	
<b>Kirkuk</b>		"base"			Army: Camp Warrior 7.5 Medical Facility 6.1 Tactical Ops Centre*	"enduring base"		
<b>Mosul</b>		"base and airfield"			Army: 2.9 Troop Medical Clinic 9.9 Combat Support Hospital 9.3 CMU Barracks FOB Marez	"enduring base"		
<b>Muthanna</b>					Army: 11.3 Bunker Sealing			
<b>Nu'maniyya</b>							165 Iraqi Base	
<b>Qayyarah</b>				"base" alternative: Erbil				
<b>Taji</b>					Army: 24.6 CMU	"enduring base"	49.6 spending in 2005 15,000 Iraqi Troops	
<b>Tallil</b>	Forawrd Air Base	"base near Nasiriyah"		"enduring base" "contingency operating base"	Army: 10.8 Temporary Contonment Area	"contingency operating base"	10.8 spending in 2005 110.3 requested	Army: Ali Base Camp Adder Camp Cedar I + II 5.7 Construct Replace Roads 22 Construct Base Perimeter Security Fence 69 Convoy Support Centre 13.6 Dining Facility
<b>Taqaddum</b>								6.3 Air Control Tower
<b>Tikrit</b>		"base near Tikrit"				"enduring base"		
<b>Iraq General</b>			Army: 115.9 Power Plants, Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities, Joint Operations Centre etc.		Army: 300 Overhead Compartment Protection 36 Main Supply Route Aspen 55.2 CMU Billeting			Army: 167 Counter IED/Urban By-Pass Road

\*These figures are in US\$ millions. We do not give a breakdown of the numbers since we only had access to the figures given in the Supplemental Requests scrutinized in this paper.

†The request was for US\$ 25 million. Congress has downgraded this to \$15 million via the Congressional Appropriations Committee.

‡The location of Kirkuk for these facilities is clarified by the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, The Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005.

<sup>1</sup> See for instance Gary Hart, "End This Evasion on Permanent Army Bases in Iraq," *Financial Times*, January 3, 2006.

<sup>2</sup> Program of International Policy Attitudes, *What the Iraqi Public Wants*, Washington, January 31, 2006, p. 3.

<sup>3</sup> Larry Diamond, "What Went Wrong in Iraq and Prospects for Democracy and Stability," at the UCLA *International Institute*, February 7, 2005, <[www.international.ucla.edu](http://www.international.ucla.edu)>.

<sup>4</sup> Steve Bowman, *Iraq: U.S. Military Operations*, CRS Report for Congress, RL31701, January 23, 2006, p. 5.

<sup>5</sup> Jim VandeHei, "Bush Says U.S. Troops Will Stay in Iraq Past '08. GOP Unrest Dismissed As Sign of Election Year," *The Washington Post*, March 22, 2006.

<sup>6</sup> *FY 2005 Department of Defense Supplemental Request*, available at <<http://www.dod.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2006/index.html>>.

<sup>7</sup> Available at <<http://thomas.loc.gov>>.

<sup>8</sup> This becomes clear as the only Asian countries for which construction funds were requested were Afghanistan and Iraq. See *Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005*, Report, pp. 109-52, April 6, 2005, tables at pp. 32 and 35.

<sup>9</sup> For statements of congressmen and senators on the question of permanent bases, see Sam Graham-Felsen, "Operation: Enduring Presence," *AlterNet*, available at <[www.alternet.org/story/23755/](http://www.alternet.org/story/23755/)>.

<sup>10</sup> Ann Scott Tyson, "U.S. May Significantly Reduce Troops in Iraq next Spring, Statements Suggest Heightened Sense of Urgency for Move," *The Washington Post*, July 27, 2005; Tom Engelhardt, "Permanent Bases in Iraq? The Bush Administration Claims the U.S. Intends to Leave Iraq. But Its Massive Military 'Super Bases' Tell a Different Story," Salon.com, February 15, 2006.

<sup>11</sup> Available at <<http://thomas.loc.gov>>.

<sup>12</sup> Kenneth Katzman, *Iraq: U.S. Regime Change Efforts and Post-Saddam Governance*, CRS Report for Congress, RL31339, Washington, February 9, 2006, pp. 39-41. With regard to the numbers of the troops involved in the drawdown, they are approximately the same as in Bowman, op.cit., p. 5.

<sup>13</sup> See George W. Bush, "U.S. Efforts on Security in Iraq," *Remarks to the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies*, The George Washington University, Washington, DC, March 13, 2006; available at [www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rm/2006/63033.htm](http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rm/2006/63033.htm). See the analysis of the speech at Peter Baker, "Bush Sets Target for Transition in Iraq," *The Washington Post*, March 14, 2006.

<sup>14</sup> The following discussion is based on Katzman, op. cit.; for an analysis of the debate see Thomas R. Mattair, "Exiting Iraq: Competing Strategies," in *Middle East Policy*, XIII/1 (2006), pp. 69-83.

<sup>15</sup> 50,000 troops based in Iraq would cost \$5 billion to \$7 billion a year. See David R. Francis, "U.S. Bases in Iraq: Sticky Politics, Hard Math," *The Christian Science Monitor*, September 30, 2004.

<sup>16</sup> Seymour M. Hersh, "Up in the Air. Where Is the Iraq War Headed Next?" *The New Yorker*, December 5, 2005.

<sup>17</sup> Available at <<http://thomas.loc.gov>>.

<sup>18</sup> Sam Graham-Felsen, "Operation: Enduring Presence." *AlterNet*, available at <[www.alternet.org/story/23755/](http://www.alternet.org/story/23755/)>.

<sup>19</sup> "Bremer: U.S. Would Leave Iraq If New Leadership So Requests," *USA Today*, May 14, 2004.

<sup>20</sup> Christine Spolar, "14 'Enduring Bases' Set in Iraq. Long-Term Military Presence Planned," *The Chicago Tribune*, March 23, 2004; Ashraf Fahim, "Basic Questions about Bases," *Asia Times*, August 6, 2005.

<sup>21</sup> *Strengthening U.S. Global Posture, Report To Congress*, Washington September 17, 2004, p. 13. Available at <[www.defensecommunities.org/ResourceCenter/Global\\_Posture.pdf](http://www.defensecommunities.org/ResourceCenter/Global_Posture.pdf)>; for a general discussion of the new global posture see Benjamin Shreer, *Die Neuordnung der amerikanischen Auslandsstützpunkte. Die "Global Posture Review" der Bush-Administration*, Berlin, SWP, August 2005.

<sup>22</sup> *Global Posture*, p. 13.

<sup>23</sup> Larry Diamond, *Squandered Victory. The American Occupation and the Bungled Effort to Bring Democracy to Iraq*, (Times Book 2005) p. 159, 241.

<sup>24</sup> Thomas Donnelly, "Rebasing Revisited," *National Security Outlook*, December 2004, p. 2; available at <[www.aei.org](http://www.aei.org)>.

<sup>25</sup> Juan Cole, "The Iraq War is Over, and the Winner is ... Iran," Salon.com, July 21, 2005.

<sup>26</sup> Ann Scott Tyson, "U.S. May Significantly Reduce Troops in Iraq Next Spring, Statements Suggest Heightened Sense of Urgency for Move," *The Washington Post*, July 27, 2005.

<sup>27</sup> See <<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/iraq.htm>>.

<sup>28</sup> Thom Shanker and Eric Schmitt, "Pentagon Expects Long-Term Access to Four Key Bases in Iraq;" *The New York Times*, April 19, 2003; Christine Spolar, "14 'Enduring Bases' Set in Iraq. Long-Term Military Presence Planned," *The Chicago Tribune*, March 23, 2004.

<sup>29</sup> Bradley Graham, "Commanders Plan Eventual Consolidation of U.S. Bases in Iraq," *The Washington Post*, May 22, 2005.

<sup>30</sup> We have utilized three requests: *FY 2004 Supplemental Request for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), And Operation Noble Eagle (ONE)*, September 2003; *FY 2005 Supplemental Request for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), and Operation Unified Assistance*, February 2005; *FY 2006 Supplemental Request for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)*, February 2006. All are available at the Comptroller of the Department of Defense's site at <<http://www.dod.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2007/index.html>>.

<sup>31</sup> Bradley Graham, "Commanders Plan Eventual Consolidation of U.S. Bases in Iraq," *The Washington Post*, May 22, 2005.

<sup>32</sup> See *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Special Operations, Task Force Operations*, December 19, 2001. Available at <[http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new\\_pubs/jp3\\_05\\_1.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_05_1.pdf)>.

<sup>33</sup> *Strengthening U.S. Global Posture, Report To Congress*, Washington, September 17, 2004, p. 13. Available at [www.defensecommunities.org/ResourceCenter/Global\\_Posture.pdf](http://www.defensecommunities.org/ResourceCenter/Global_Posture.pdf).

<sup>34</sup> For a description of Balad, see Thomas E. Ricks, "Biggest Base in Iraq Has Small-Town Feel," *The Washington Post*, February 4, 2006.

<sup>35</sup> In 2003 this hospital facility was still in tent structures; funding to construct a properly built hospital passed Congress in 2005.

<sup>36</sup> See Oliver Poole, "Football and Pizza Point to U.S. Staying for Long Haul," *The Telegraph*, February 11, 2006.

<sup>37</sup> Tom Engelhardt, "Bases, Bases Everywhere," *Asia Times*, June 3, 2005.

<sup>38</sup> Chris Hughes, "Billion Dollar Bunker. U.S. Plans Embassy More Secure than Pentagon," *The Mirror*, January 3, 2006; David Phinney, "Baghdad Embassy Bonanza," *CorpWatch*, February 12, 2006.

<sup>39</sup> <<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/qayyarah-west.htm>>.

<sup>40</sup> See Stan Heath, "New Coalition Headquarters to Open in Tikrit," *Arnews*, August 15, 2005.

<sup>41</sup> Joshua Hammer, "Digging In," *Mother Jones*, March/April 2005. The National Defense Strategy 2005 already foresees lesser contingency operations "perhaps for extended periods of time" (NDS 2005 III B 1).

<sup>42</sup> *FY 2005 Supplemental Request*, p. 60.

<sup>43</sup> *FY 2006 Supplemental Request*, p. 67.

<sup>44</sup> On the latest wave of strife and brutality against the Iraqi population, see Steven Hurst, "Iraq War Changing with Attacks on Cos.," (AP) *The Mercury News*, March 29, 2006, [www.MercuryNews.com](http://www.MercuryNews.com)

<sup>45</sup> "Iraqi Radical Shiite Leader Blasts Rumsfeld," *Khaleej Times*, March 13, 2006.

<sup>46</sup> Donnelly, "Rebasing Revisited," op. cit., p. 3.

<sup>47</sup> Vicky Allen, "Abizaid Says U.S. May Want to Keep Bases in Iraq," Reuters, March 14, 2006.