Grivas was the Cyprus-born military hero of the 1950s, a hero to Greek Cypriots, because he led the campaign of terror and obstruction against the British. Grivas (below, right, with Makarios) was a Greek colonel who earned fame during the Greek civil war following World War II. Fiercely anticommunist, he was also fiercely nationalistic, believing that Cyprus should be a part of Greece. He organized and led EOKA, the underground group that conducted operations against British installations, assassinated Greek Cypriot Acollaborators,@ and then---after the Turkish Cypriots began to assert themselves against enosis in 1958---turned his violent methods against them. He was at odds with Makarios, particularly when the Archbishop accepted the anti-enosis treaties of 1959. His brand of militancy became increasingly destructive in the 1960s, as Turkey would no longer tolerate his antics. He died just before the bloody events of 1974, events which EOKA B set in motion. While his Avision@ of a Cyprus that would be a province of Greece was responsible in part for Britain quitting the island, this same vision roused Turkey and led, perhaps, to its insistence on partition. The excerpts below, from his book, Guerrilla Warfare, provide unique insights into the operations against the British in the 1950s. It also reveals the single-mindedness that excluded a multicultural future for Cyprus, and hence fostered the polarization that led to the divided island.

George Grivas (right)

PART II

STRATEGIC CONCEPTION OF THE CAMPAIGN

THE STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE

In my General Plan' of insurrectionary action in Cyprus I defined this objective as follows:

'By deeds of heroism and self-sacrifice to draw the attention of international public opinion, especially among the allies of Greece. . .

'By continuously harassing the British in Cyprus, we must show that we are firmly determined not to yield, whatever the sacrifice, but that on the contrary we are prepared to continue until international diplomacy exercised through the United Nations, and the British in particular, are compelled to examine the Cyprus problem and reach a speedy settlement in accordance with the aspirations of the Cypriot people and the whole Greek nation.'

I also wrote in my General Plan:

It should not be supposed that by these means we should expect to impose a total defeat on the British forces in Cyprus. Our purpose is to win a moral victory through a process of attrition, by harassing, confusing and finally exasperating the enemy forces, with the object of achieving our main aim as defined [above] . . .' -

This clear strategic objective remained unchanged right to the end of the struggle and guided all our actions.

ORIGINAL STRATEGIC PLAN

I studied and took into consideration the following factors:

Terrain. Cyprus is an island with an area of 3,584 square miles, which can easily be blockaded by the opponent by sea and air and consequently can be cut off from all external supplies. The nature of the terrain did not facilitate the conduct of any conventional guerrilla operations. The two mountain massifs - Olympus and Pentadactylos - are everywhere easily negotiable on foot and are crossed in all directions by tarred roads. Troops can be transported by motor vehicle from the capital, Nicosia, to any point in the island in the space of about two hours. Finally, the small area made it possible for the British to conduct frequent and detailed searches.

Population. The inhabitants had no experience of war because the Cypriots had no military service. Though by nature peace-loving, the Greeks of Cyprus, who form 80 per cent of the population, lived in the belief and the steadfast hope that some day someone would be found to raise the standard of insurrection and win them their freedom.

This live and unshakeable yearning for freedom which inspired all Cypriots was my principal trump card.

Arms. These were non-existent and had to be imported, at any rate the bulk of them, before the beginning of the struggle, because later it would be very difficult to bring any in. The capture of arms from the enemy in sufficient quantities did not appear to be a practicable proposition.

The Opponent. The enemy had unlimited resources at his disposal and complete control of the island.

The strategic objective, as defined, and the other factors mentioned above formed the basis and dictated the lines of my 'General Plan' which consisted of the following:

1. Combat operations. Sabotage of government installations and posts.

Surprise attacks by a small number of highly mobile combat units against the British forces.

Each of these missions would have to be entrusted to special units which, at any rate at the outset, would have to be small in numbers, both because of lack of equipment and framed personnel, and for precautionary reasons, to enable me easily to modify my plan in accordance with developments with the greatest possible speed.

At first I concentrated my main effort on sabotage. As I wrote in my General PI "Because of the difficulty of conducting a systematic, large-scale armed guerrilla campaign and in view of the fact that the territory is not capable of absorbing large guerrilla forces, the main weight of the campaign will be placed on sabotage." Further on I say: AI do not believe that the number of shock groups should be more '49 than [the figure laid down in the Plan], at any rate initially. For a higher number would make it harder for them to hide or to get away in the event of attack. The terrain should appear empty so as to make dis- covery difficult by British search forces; passing through the enemy lines and escape will also thus be facilitated.'

However I did not exclude the possibility, should suitable conditions present themselves, of the guerrilla armed struggle developing on a bigger and more intensive scale than originally planned.

'Should events take a more favourable turn," I wrote in the General Plan, >and always provided that sufficient weapons are available, one

should not exclude the possibility of the armed struggle increasing

both in scale and intensity.

'Action under the [two] forms mentioned above [sabotage and armed

attack], if it is to attain its object, cannot be confined to minor and

intermittent operations against insignificant targets but must involve

a vigorous and continuous campaign, aimed at getting important

results.'

2. The laying down. in general terms, of subsidiary plans for passive

resistance, information, supplies etc.

ORGANIZATION OF THE CAMPAIGN

PREPARATION

Taking into consideration the special conditions of the struggle, as

outlined above, the preparatory stage passed through two phases.

The first consisted of two personal reconnaissances which I made

in Cyprus. On the basis of these, the General Plan was drawn up, the

methods to be employed during the struggle were studied, the first

combat units were formed and arrangements made for taking delivery

of the arms to be sent from Greece. On my return to Greece I devoted

my whole efforts to getting these supplies together. This phase lasted

from June 1951 to November 1954.

The second phase began with my arrival in Cyprus, which took

place in the greatest secrecy. It was devoted to organizing and training

the first combat units, to the selection and reconnaissance of the first

targets and to the drawing up of the plans of attack against these

targets. This phase covered the period between November 1954 and

1 April 1955, which date marked the beginning of the struggle. Field-

Marshal Harding, in articles published in the Daily Telegraph, admits

that at the time when we started operations, almost nothing was known

to the British authorities in Cyprus about our organization and the

names of its leaders.

The main feature which characterized both phases was secrecy.

Thanks to this, we were able to take the enemy completely by sur-

prise, so much so that, by the admission of the British authorities in

the island, several months after we went into action they still possessed

no positive information about the Organization. On 20 June 1955 the

British Commander of the Cyprus Police admitted to journalists that

he was completely in the dark about the Organization - E O K A - and

was not on its tracks.

Had the British got wind of what we were doing during the prepara-

tory stage, it would have been impossible to transport the arms to the

island, and the struggle, even if it broke out at all, would have been

nipped in the bud. It is a generally recognized truth that careful

preparation and securing the element of surprise are half the secret of

success. The other half depends on skilful leadership. In my opinion,

given these two factors, numbers are not of such great importance in

guerrilla warfare. It is also significant that our opponent, strategically,

was taken by surprise: a fact due not only to the secrecy of our

preparations and of our first operations, but also to his lack of

preparedness and the unco-ordinated nature of his actions, both tacti-

cally and from the point of view of organization, that might have

enabled him to cope with such a struggle. Consequently, the enemy

wasted a good deal of time in preparations to enable him to take

action, with the known unfortunate results. The British army in Cyprus,

owing to the nature of its organization and formation, was a clumsy

weapon completely lacking in the training necessary for this kind of

fighting. The same applied to the police who, in addition, were not

equipped with suitable-arms, which were only hastily sent out from

England and distributed to them several months after we had gone into

operation. The British, in order to train their forces for guerrilla war-

fare, carried out their first joint army and police exercises in the

Kyrenia at the beginning of June 1955. According to information

supplied to us by a member of the police force who took part, the

tactics employed were the following: fast-moving transport was sent

out along the roads to cut off the retreat of the supposed guerrilla

groups, while other sections advanced over the mountain-tops in order

gradually to throw a tight cordon round the supposed area of flight of

the guerrillas. Troops surrounded every village, because the inhabited

areas were regarded as providing the main hiding-places where the

guerrillas could conceal themselves and receive food from the vil-

lagers. Helicopters flew above the area of operations to notify the

troops of any guerrilla movements.

The results of these exercises, as reported to me, were far from

encouraging for the British, who found that:

1. It was impossible to cut off all communication by road.

2. It was extremely difficult to search mountain terrain, especially

when thickly covered with forest.

3. It was also difficult to carry out effective search of the villages,

given the hostility of the inhabitants towards the British forces.

ORGANIZATION OF FORCES AND RESOURCES

My main task was to create the instrument or instruments needed to

facilitate the execution of my plan, and to make the best use of them.

My efforts began during the preparatory stage and continued, at an

accelerated pace, throughout the duration of the struggle. I state below

what were the main organizational themes I had to face, and how I

dealt with each one.

ORGANIZATION OF COMBAT UNITS: The struggle in Cyprus

was of a quite special nature. Secrecy and the need to secure the element

of surprise made it necessary to avoid starting large-scale organiza-

tion too early.

The organization had to be carried out in Cyprus itself, on British-

occupied territory where we could not form a base of our own. The

organization of a revolutionary army in Greece itself to invade Cyprus

was not possible for the following reasons: the Greek Government

would not allow the organization of any such force on Greek territory

in order to avoid an open breach with Great Britain; an invasion of

Cyprus would have to be either by a forced landing, for which we did

not have the necessary means, or by the secret disembarkation of small

sections, with only the slightest chances of success, if at all. Further, it

would be extremely difficult for any such preparation to escape the

attention of the British agents in Greece. For this reason I ruled out

the organization even of small bodies and their dispatch, by sections,

to Cyprus.

Consequently, we sacrificed numbers for the sake of surprise. There

could be no question of disposing of a large or even adequate strength,

because of our great inferiority in resources. My advantage would lie

in the use of suitable tactics which would enable me, on each occasion

and within the necessary time-limit, to have the upper hand.

It followed that the combat units would be organized by degrees.

Initially we organized some sabotage groups in the towns These did

not exceed twenty in number. Later on, in July-August 1955, I brought

into action a few groups of guerrillas. As my resources increased, I pro-

ceeded to strengthen both sabotage and guerrilla units. But our

resources were extremely limited. Arms were imported from Greece

under great difficulties, in driblets, either through the parcel post or

through our couriers. Consequently, I was later forced to use shot-

guns, a quantity of which I seized from their owners in a single night.

I used them to form special detachments, called 'Shotgun Commando

Groups' (known, under their Greek initials, as OKT). They gave excel-

lent results in ambushes.

As regards munitions, at the start we were very short but gradually

we succeeded in supplying our own needs. Certain quantities we were

able to salvage from ships which had been sunk off the coasts of

Cyprus during the Second World War. Others we manufactured using

explosives obtainable in Cyprus itself and sold in the shops. We even

produced such things as land mines.

In this way we gradually succeeded, under fantastically difficult con-

ditions, in forming our invisible army which covered the whole island.

This army was everywhere, in the smallest village, in the furthest

point of the island. It was present everywhere but never showed itself.

As for its numbers, it is difficult even for me to say. For, ultimately,

because of our system, every Greek Cypriot, from the smallest child

to old men and women, belonged to, our~army, and fulfilled a mission

either as a combatant or in the auxiliary services. Furthermore, the

secrecy maintained throughout .the Organization was so perfect that

although our opponent managed to learn about its general lines, he

never succeeded in discovering the essential feature of the whole

secret machinery and consequently was unable to break it up and

crush it.

At first, the enemy tried to dislocate the Organization by arresting

dynamic elements, mostly young people, but without success.' Later, he

resorted to mass arrests (2,100 Greeks were rounded up in one night),

but again with no result. Our secret lay above all in the choice of our

fighters, in our system of organization and in the tactics followed,

which made it difficult for the enemy to capture them. Further, any

gaps in the ranks, from whatever cause, were at once filled from our

reserves which we were careful always to have ready up to strength.

PARTICIPATION OF THE POPULATION: A revolutionary

movement and a guerrilla war, in particular, stand no chance of suc-

cess, whatever the qualities of their leader, unless they have the

complete and unreserved support of the majority of the country's

inhabitants, for it is to them that the movement will turn for assistance

of every kind (cadres and fighters, hiding places, concealment of

equipment and men, liaison agents, food supplies, propaganda, etc.).

My own military career has taught me that the collapse of the front

usually begins from the rear. Consequently, I devoted my attention

to organizing the population in order not only to get it actively to

participate in the struggle but also to enable it to hold out, seeing that

our struggle was above all a matter of time and endurance.

Already on 23 March 1955, in a letter addressed to Archbishop

Makarios in which I set out my General Plan of organization, I fore-

told the total participation of the people in the armed struggle through

uprisings and disturbances. I concluded as follows:

'Should the plan I have sketched above, namely, of acts of sabotage,

attacks on police stations, activity of guerrilla bands, etc., be crowned

with success, then I shall organize a general uprising of the youth in

the towns and in the rural districts, in the form of aggressive demonstra-

tions in which the organized population will take part.'

For four years, alongside the armed campaign, there went on a con-

tinuous struggle as to which of the two opponents would win the

population over to his side. The weapon used by the British was

force. But it was found that the harsher the measures resorted to by

the British, the more the population became estranged from them and

inclined to our side. Civilized peoples cannot be won over 'through

violence, only through good treatment and a just and paternal adminis-

tration. The representatives of Britain in Cyprus, both soldiers and

civilians, behaved towards the inhabitants with an animosity which

was far from politic. They were completely deficient in that under-

standing of the mass psychology which is so essential a factor of

success in such circumstances. They showed by their behaviour that

they had been unable to penetrate the motives which had impelled the

Cypriot people to rise up against them. This was a serious disadvan-

tage. All the British Governors in Cyprus failed miserably in this

respect. In my Memoirs I have written an objective criticism of the

two Governors. Harding and Foot. and of their behaviour towards the

population. We, on the other hand, used methods which were in the

main based on mass psychology, we employed persuasion, we set an

example of endurance in the face of danger and privation, but above

all we stimulated the people's faith in the justice of their cause.

Throughout the struggle I never ceased for a single moment to strive

to hold the people's moral support. In this I was completely successful

and my appeal always met with full response on the part of all the

Greeks of the island, whatever the sacrifice demanded. Every call on

my part was regarded by the population as an order to fulfil a national

duty. My proclamations were looked upon as sacred documents. Every

man hastened to acquaint himself with their contents and to comply

with them. My orders overrode the laws of the local British administ-

ration. In this way, I won the confidence of the Greek population of

the island and every Greek Cypriot became a member of E o K A. The

reply which the Mayor of Nicosia, Mr Dervis, gave the British

Governor is a good example. When the latter demanded that the

inhabitants help to arrest members of EOKA, the Mayor replied:

'But we all belong to EOKA.=

The success of any revolutionary movement depends, amongst other

things, on political vision, skill and diplomatic tact towards the

population. Who wins over the people, has won half the battle. It is,

of course, one of the qualities of a leader to distinguish what means he

must employ for that end. One can lay down no rules, no ready-made

prescriptions.

I wish to stress that in the choice of my first key men I never

made any distinction of social class, either among townsmen or vil-

lagers, and this continued to be my policy throughout. Communist

revolutions usually start from the masses who have economic

grievances, that is, among the workmen and peasants; the movement

makes them all kinds of promises, and with the support of these

classes imposes itself on the rest. But national liberation movements

must express the will of the whole people. Liberation struggles succeed

only when they find a response among the people. True to these ideas,

I started my struggle by choosing my key men from the towns where I

found the youth better organized, with a more marked patriotic

enthusiasm for the fight, which was in time communicated to the whole

of the island.

I cannot say which class contributed most. For the whole Greek

population of the island rallied round the Organization as a single

man, burning with desire for combat, and every man gave what he

could. The one exception was, needless to say, the Communist leader-

ship, the mass of whose followers, however, deserted them: the only

ones who adhered by them were a few party officials and a small

number of fanatics, whereas the great majority condemned their

leaders and joined in EOKA'S struggle.

The organization of the population, as described later,

was so markedly successful that the whole Greek population of

Cyprus, roused from its slumbers, obeyed the order and took part in

the fight, regardless of sex and age. In the villages the women formed

resistance groups and stood up to the British attacks, some of them

falling victims to enemy bullets. In the towns young girls formed

sabotage and assault groups. Some of them were arrested and

imprisoned, while many women carried out dangerous missions as

liaisons or for the transport of arms.

At Geneva, where I was asked to speak on the Cyprus liberation

campaign, I was asked by someone the following question: 'What

you have told us about organizing the population is all very well, but

don't forget you had to deal with the British. But what would happen

if we had to do with Russians who, apart from the much more

rigorous measures they would be likely to take in order to overawe

b, the population, might even go so far as to deport all the inhabitants of

an insurrectionary region?'

My reply:" 'A people, who are determined to rise against their

masters and have the faith to continue the struggle, must always

reckon with the harsh measures which will be taken against them, and

must be ready to face them, otherwise it is better they should stay

quiet. A leader who places himself at the head of such a movement

without previously studying the people's capacities is bound to fail.

No one ever imagined that the Greeks of Cyprus would be able to hold

out against the harsh measures taken then by the British authorities.

But nevertheless they did hold out. The Nazis during the last war

took the most rigorous measures against the countries in insurrection

against them. They even established crematoria in Germany where

the inhabitants of the regions in revolt were transported and burnt.

Yet the peoples did not yield to force. As regards the deportations, it is

not such an easy matter to expel hundreds of thousands or even

millions from their homes, because then the question arises of how

these people are to be fed.

'Even if one ignores the international organizations which are sure

to intervene in such a case - and it is quite possible that the Russians

would ignore them - there exists another right, which they are bound to

take into account - namely the right of reprisal."

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