The increasing involvement of the United States in the Cyprus dispute included a fitful and doomed negotiation by Dean Acheson. It was doomed because it was too radical for any of the four parties to accept. The involvement of Acheson is interesting for one particular reason - - he was the embodiment of the American Aestablishment,@ the secretary of state during the Truman administration and thereby Apresent at the creation,@ in his famous phrase, of the post-war order, which included the Cold War, the U.N., and NATO, all of which were important considerations for the international community when it came to Cyprus. His mission was also the occasion for heightened awareness of the Cyprus problem in the United States; the failure of Acheson Plan, in fact, was treated in the American press as further evidence of Makarios=s deviousness and pro-Soviet tilt, a very considerable charge in those days. Below is the text of Acheson's efforts and some correspondence with Greek prime minister George Papandreou in August 1964.

In return for Turkish agreement to the union of Cyprus with Greece, Greece would make certain concessions to Turkey along the lines suggested below:

1. To give Turkey assurance that its security would not be threatened from Cyprus or from the direction of Cyprus, Greece would cede to Turkey a portion of the Island in perpetuity, that is in full sovereignty.

A. This area would be used by Turkey as a military base with full rights to deploy ground, air and naval forces therein. The military purpose of this base would be to deny the Island to hostile forces as a base of operations against Turkey and to keep open the approaches to the ports of Mersin and Iskenderun.

B. The area should be fairly substantial in size, large enough both to permit the building of facilities and the conduct of training maneuvers and operations.

C. It seemed that a logical location for the base area might be the Karpas Peninsula because it was detached from the main body of the Island and was ideally situated to cover the approaches to the Turkish ports. Different boundary lines for a base on the Peninsula were discussed at different times; one, which appeared to be the minimum acceptable to the Turkish Government, ran from Peristeria on the north coast to a point just southwest of Boghaz on the southeast coast. (The Turks agreed that the Monastery of Apostolos Andreas, near the tip of the peninsula, could be excluded from the base area).

2. Special arrangements should be made for the protection and welfare of those Turkish Cypriots who would not be included within the area of the Turkish sovereign base. (This, of course, means the vast majority of the Turkish Cypriot population). These were outlined as follows:

A. There might be one, two or three relatively small areas of the Island in which Turkish-Cypriots would be in the majority or very nearly so and which could be treated as separate geographical units for administrative purposes within the general governmental structure of the whole Island. The Turkish quarter of Nicosia and the area stretching north of it to the Kyrenia Range was a de facto example of such an area. These administrative subdivisions could have a special local administration of their own, directed and implemented on the ground by Turkish-Cypriots. The functions of these local administrations would have to be spelled out after careful study but might include such things as the collection of taxes, the expenditure of local revenues for local purposes (schools, mosques, local water supply, local roads, etc), the direction of local police forces and the general administration of justice insofar as it applied to Turkish-Cypriots, and possible other attributes of municipal and provincial governments everywhere. These administrations could not constitute, however, states within a state; they would necessarily be ultimately responsible to some higher authority, which might be the central government of Cyprus or the government of Greece or its senior representative on Cyprus.

B. In all the rest of the Island, where Turkish-Cypriots would necessarily continue to be a relatively small minority of the population, a different arrangement could be made. There might be a central Turkish-Cypriot administration established in Nicosia which would control, for Turkish-Cypriots only, much of the same activities and functions that would be undertaken by the local authorities in the separate small geographic units mentioned above. This could be done by demarcating the Turkish quarters of the major towns and identifying the scattered villages which are all-Turkish, or have a clear Turkish majority. These would then be considered as under the authority of the central Turkish organization in Nicosia, which would supervise the election or appointment of local leaders, the selection and administration of police and other normal municipal functions and could provide a system of lower courts for the handling of personal status cases, civil suits between Turks, criminal trials involving only Turks and similar matters of purely Turkish-Cypriot concern. Like its counterparts in the separate geographical units, this organization would in turn be responsible to the central authority of the Island. Clearly, many aspects would have to be worked out by those concerned.

C. The Turkish-Cypriots would necessarily have to be citizens of whatever central authority was in control of the Island. Subject to the privileges and responsibilities of this citizenship, they could have the local and personal rights and privileges indicated in the preceding two paragraphs. It goes without saying that they would be guaranteed all normal human and minority rights, of which those provided in the Treaty of Lausanne are good examples.

D. As a special safeguard in addition, Mr. Acheson suggested that there should be an international commissioner or commission, perhaps appointed by the U.N. or the International Court of Justice, who or which could be physically present on the Island and charged with watching over the observations of the special status and rights of the Turkish-Cypriots. Precedents for this exist in the cases of Danzig and the Saar during the period between World Wars I and II, and the U.S. Government considers that this experiment worked well until the advent of Hitler to power in Germany upset all established arrangements. The commissioner or the commission would be

empowered to hear complaints, investigate them and to make recommendations to the appropriate authorities for correction of injustices. It is conceivable that he might be empowered to order correction and or compensation, subject to appeal by the party opposed. If his recommendations or decisions were not accepted by one party or the other, there would be a right of appeal either to the International Court of Justice at The Hague or to some other judicial body which might be specially established under the authority of the U.N. An alternative which the parties might wish to consider would be for the commissioner and the court to be appointed by NATO, with the NATO members assuming responsibility for enforcement of their decisions.

1. The Turkish base area simply be leased to Turkey for an agreed period of years - 50 was suggested as reasonable - instead of being ceded as sovereign Turkish territory.

2. The boundary of the base area on the Karpas Peninsula would be a line drawn north and south just west of the village of Komi Kebir (thus reducing the area considerably). Alternatively, Mr. Acheson suggested that the line could be drawn on the basis of military considerations after study by the Supreme Allied Commander for Europe.

3. The special provisions and guarantees for the Turkish-Cypriots would be modified from those proposed in Acheson Plan I to eliminate the special areas containing a Turkish-Cypriot majority which would have been treated under the first plan as moderate administrative units. Instead, it was suggest-ed that at least two of the eparchies into which Cyprus might be divided under Greek rule would always be headed by Turkish-Cypriot eparchs. These eparchies would always be those containing a substantial Turkish-Cypriot population. In the eparchies containing such a substantial Turkish-Cypriot population, the administrative staffs, police, etc. would always contain a substantial proportion of Turkish-Cypriot officials and employees.

4. Instead of the central Turkish-Cypriot administration in Nicosia which was proposed in Acheson Plan I, there would be a high official in the central Government of Cyprus, under the chief Greek administrator, who would be provided with a staff and would be charged with looking after the rights and welfare of all Turkish-Cypriots. This official would advice and assist Turk-ish-Cypriots, receive and investigate complaints about discriminatory treatment or failure to give guaranteed rights, and could appeal to the courts or central government of Greece in case of need.

5. The special guarantees or minority rights envisaged in the first plan, such as those provided by the Treaty of Lausanne and the European Convention on Human Rights, would be retained.

6. Similarly, the proposed International Commissioner appointed by the U.N. would be part of the second plan as of the first.

"In the previous talks I recommended to the Greek Government that, within the framework of a solution which it might be possible to find regarding the Cyprus problem, either for an independent Cyprus or of a Cyprus directly connected with Greece, certain rights of self administration must be secured for the Turkish minority.

The minority must also have full legal safeguards of acknowledged human and minority rights, of the type that are defined in the Lausanne Treaty. In order to give to Turkey and to the Turkish Cypriots the assurance that these arrangements will be applied and will be absolutely respected, I had proposed that this would be done by an international supervisory representative or group. You were kind enough to inform me that the Prime Minister had agreed, in principle, to these proposals, and I consider this as an important step forward to the direction of the peace objective, which we are trying to reach.

I do not think it is necessary or desirable to try to define now the details of the provisions of the minority rights, which must be included in the final solution.

These can be derived from the Lausanne Treaty, the Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations and other known texts. Without doubt there have to be amendments to correspond to the circumstances which prevail in Cyprus. In any case the task of drafting such provisions will take a long a time and needs more staff than what you and have at our disposal. The agreement for the exact provisions which must be included must, by necessity, be agreed between Greece and Turkey.

It would, however, be useful for you and the Prime Minister, if I try to give you some more concrete ideas regarding the administrative arrangements which I have in mind, and the aspects of the plan of supervision.

As I foresee it is likely that there will be one or two, perhaps three areas in the island in which the Turks will have the majority or almost the majority.

For the time being, the Turkish sectors of Nicosia and the area which extends to the north, towards the Kyrenia range is one example of such an area. These areas would be treated as separate geographical units for administrative purposes, in the framework of the general Government organisation of the administration of the island. They could have their own special local administrations which would be directed and applied by Turkish Cypriots.

If the island is annexed to Greece, these units could be called districts on condition that the District Commissioner and the largest part of his staff would always be Turkish Cypriots, and would have a considerable degree of local autonomy.

Their functions would include the collection of taxes, either for local or national purposes, the cost of the local expenditure for schools, local systems 'of supplying water for domestic purposes, roads, drainage systems and other public works. They could also include, the administration of the local police forces and the general administration of justice. In reality they must have all the jurisdiction of municipal and district governments in every respect and substantial freedom should be given in the administration of their affairs with the minimum possible intereference of the Central Government.

As I understand it, the organisation of the Greek administration must be such that would permit considerable flexibility in this sector. The Dodecanese, for instance, are administered in a somewhat different manner than the mainland of Greece. These local governments would not constitute a state within a state.

In the last analysis they would be responsible to a superior authority, which may be the central government of an independent Cyprus, the supreme representative of the Greek state in Cyprus, or the Government of Greece in Athens. The district commissioner would be appointed in

the usual manner by the central authority on condition that he must be a Turkish Cypriot. If the district should have a substantial number of Greek Cypriots it would be logical for the police and certain other administrative organs to include Greek Cypriot employees in the Turkish majority.

A system of mixed police patrols could be used, for instance, in certain areas (this would also be useful in areas outside the Turkish Districts).

In the rest of the island, where the Turkish Cypriots would continue to be a small minority, a different arrangement would be necessary. I suggest that there could be a central Turkish Cypriot administration in Nicosia, which would exercise control on the Turkish Cypriots only, in most of the same activities which the local authorities would have in the Turkish districts already referred to above.

One way in which this could be done would be to agree on the boundaries of the Turkish sectors of the largest towns and to define the villages which are Turkish as well as where the Turks are in the majority. These would be under the jurisdiction of the Turkish administration in

Nicosia, which will have at its head a district Commissioner, who would supervise the election or appointment of the local authorities, the administration of the police and other public functions, and of the lower courts for the hearing of cases of personal status, civil cases between Turks, criminal prosecutions against Turks and similar cases of purely Turkish interest. Similarly, the corresponding authorities in the separate geographical districts, the organisation would be answerable to the central authority of the island, whichever it might be, but it would have a substantive degree of administrative freedom. It is obvious, that many aspects of this plan should be developed and be agreed by negotiations between the interested parties. My suggestions are not intended to be in any way definitive or exclusive.

The application of the safeguards of human rights, the right to use Turkish special courts in certain kinds of cases and other similar privileges would be extended to all Turkish Cypriots, despite the fact, that for any reason, some may not come under the direct jurisdiction of either of the of two Government units which I have recommended. I presume that by agreement, the legislation of the central authority of the state, there will be a special section of the legislation which would be applicable equally for all the Turkish Cypriots citizens on subjects which require special legal treatments for national, religious and customary reasons. All Turks will, of course be citizens of the state and will have the same rights and privileges with all other inhabitants.

Despite the fact that the Greek record in the area of minorities is good, the history of the Cyprus problem and the feelings which have been created as a result of the disturbances of the last 7 months in Cyprus, have convinced me that it will be necessary in the arrangements to have special machinery to safeguard the application of such rights as would exist and the self Government of the minority.

The logical manner to achieve this, in my opinion, would be the United Nations or the International Court to appoint an international Commissioner or a commission The Commissioner or commission would be in the island and would have jurisdiction and the responsibility of the supervision of compliance with the special status and of the rights of the Turkish Cypriots. There are precedents for this in the case of Danzig and the Soar, in the interval between the first and second world war".

˜ On 20th of August, 1964, Dean Acheson sent the following letter to Prime Minister Papandreou:

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

May I begin this letter by expressing deepest appreciation of the help you have given to our work here in Geneva by your own constant attention and thought and by permitting Mr. Sossides to join in our efforts. Today the President has informed me of the urgency which he believes imminent Soviet involvement in the Cyprus problem has imparted to our work, and because of it has asked me to let you know our joint view that only a little while is left in which a settlement can be made and to give you my own views, which he has endorsed, of the general nature of the settlement which seems to me possible and fair. I know from our conversations with Mr. Sossides that you are impressed as we are here of the danger, which the Russian moves have intensified, that Cyprus will fall under Communist influence and of the far-reaching efforts which this will have upon the political and power situation in the Eastern Mediterranean. I am sure we agree that the danger gives Turkey and Greece a common interest far transcending the exact lines on a map to be drawn in reaching an agreement. The problems presented both sides in reaching a settlement are political and it is from that point of view that I approach them.

I am prepared to apply the utmost pressure and persuasion to get that Turks to give up any claim for sovereign territory on Cyprus, to reduce the dimensions of their requirements for a military base on the Karpas Peninsula and to settle the rights of minorities along the lines which I have discussed with Mr. Sossides and which I can translate into a draft to be available tomorrow. Specifically, I would urge the Turks to limit their plan to a lease for 50 years for that part of the Karpas Peninsula running from its north-easterly end to a line drawn north and south just west of Komi Kebir. I am persuaded from the study which I have made of the situation with the aid of military advisers that there is a sound military justification for such a base in the defense of the approaches tc the Turkish mainland and in the defense of the base itself from surprise attack. It is quite possible that to draw the Western line of this area as have suggested would present a political problem to you at this time This problem could be avoided by leaving the line undrawn, to be supplied after military study by the Supreme Allied Commander for Europe, with the assurance by the Government of Greece that if the lim should be drawn as indicated it would be accepted. Indeed, the willing ness of the Government of Greece to enter into such a settlement might be indicated to me without entering into any present direct commitment to the Government of Turkey. With this assurance I would do my best and believe I could succeed, in obtaining the agreement of the Government of Turkey not to intervene to prevent or to demand prior intergovernmental agreement before the achievement of enosis between Greece and Cyprus.

Without something of this sort the Turks would surely believe them-selves to be faced with having their treaty rights almost contemptuously destroyed and themselves faced with the alternatives of unconditional enosis or unconditional independence for a Cyprus under communist domination. What I have suggested will present the gravest difficulties for the leaders of both Greece and Turkey and for the peoples they lead. But I am confident that, in the face of imminent common peril, each nation can find unity at home in support of solutions which look beyond momentary controversy, to the fundamental security and welfare of great Hellenic and Turkish states and support abroad by the grand alliance of free states against interference with their execution. May I request, my dear Prime Minister, the early return to Geneva of Mr. Sossides to help us to this solution.

Sincerely yours,

Dean Acheson

˜ Letter from Prime Minister Papandreou to Dean Acheson, August 22, 1964.

Dear Mr. Acheson:

Ambassador Labouisse had the kindness to hand me yesterday your let- ter of August 20th and to inform me that your proposals have been ap- proved by Government of the United States.

1. I wish to express my warmest thanks for admirable efforts you are making to find solution to Cyprus problem: a solution which will avert war and will restore relations between allies, members of NATO. And we sincerely desire to assist your efforts in interest of Greece, of free world and peace. I fully share your view that "the danger gives Turkey and Greece a common interest for transcending exact lines on a map to be drawn..."

This is why yesterday I assured Ambassador Labouisse that we accepted "in principle" your proposals.

2. However, I deem it necessary to draw your attention upon a fundamental fact. I have impression that Government of United States may believe that if Greece accepted a plan for solution of the Cyprus question, the problem could be solved. This is not correct. Certainly our decision is of vital importance. But .finally, decisive word belongs to the leadership and people of Cyprus which is now an independent state.

The Turkish Government does not face such a problem as regards Turkish Cypriots who are subservient to Ankara. The problem exists only for us. If we accepted a solution which Cyprus would reject as unjust, situation would deteriorate. In such an event we may be certain that Cypriots will continue their struggle and seek aid from wherever it will be possible to obtain it: we already know from where they will ask and obtain it. For this important reason the conditions of an agreement should not be excessive so that they may be acceptable to Cyprus and thus lead us on a peaceful and definite settlement instead of coming to an insuperable deadlock.

3. As I informed Ambassador Labouisse yesterday, our Minister of National Defense, Mr. Garoufalias, went to Cyprus with the dual purpose of postponing conclusion of an agreement with Moscow and sounding the policies of Archbishop Makarios.

Mr. Garoufalias returned today from his mission, he succeeded in preventing, for time being, Mr. Kyprianou, the Foreign Minister of Cyprus, from leaving for Moscow tomorrow, as originally planned. He also succeeded in postponing the visit of Archbishop to Cairo in order to meet President Nasser. The postponement of both trips is temporary depending on the development of situation. Mr. Garoufalias also ascertained views of President Makarios. The Archbishop rejects absolutely granting of any base either to NATO or Turkey. He also envisages the abolition of British bases.

4. We would of course prefer obtaining Enosis without giving any- thing in exchange. This would have been fair since Turkish minority will acquire full protection under Greek administration as Moslem minority enjoys in Thrace for many years. Moreover, security of Turkey would be completely safeguarded as Cyprus becoming part of Greece would belong to NATO. Besides, since Cyprus was sold by Turkey to Great Britain the former never had any base in the island for security of Turkish state. Neither did agreements of Zurich grant Turkey such a right. We recognize, however, that underpresent conditions, for psychological reasons as well as for reasons of prestige, it will be difficult for Turkey to consent to union of Cyprus with Greece without obtaining something in exchange. This is why we are ready to offer special guarantees for Turkish Cypriots without impairing Greek sovereignty and unity of the state. We would also accept to grant lease of an area for a logical period for the installation of a Turkish base.

5. Greece could support idea of Turkish base, even if Archbishop did not agree, and could perhaps convince the great majority of Cyprus people to accept it, provided dimensions of base were limited. For in- stance, if they corresponded to extent of British bases in Cyprus. Your proposal, which I understand is result of strenuous negotiations, exceeds by far space necessary for establishment of a military base and has character of limited partition. Unfortunately we cannot support such a proposal. The difficulty has become greater owing to psychological conditions prevailing in Cyprus following the recent Turkish bombing of civilian population. The climate in island at this moment is most unfavourable to Turkey and NATO. It is also unfavourable to Greece due to her absence during Turkish aggression.

6. We understand that you have exhausted all means of persuasion with Turks so that they may reduce their claims. Therefore I am not ad- dressing to you an appeal to that effect. I confess my distress and disappointment that agreement cannot be reached. It remains now for us to do all we can for maintenance of peace in island until next session of General Assembly of United Nations to which we commit all our hopes for acceptance of principle of unre- stricted independence including right to self-determination."

˜ Letter from Dean Acheson to Prime Minister Papandreou, August 22, 1964:

My dear Prime Minister:

Thank you for your letter of August 22^nd, replying to mine of August 20^th.

I deeply regret that you have thought it not politically feasible for the Government of Greece in the present circumstances to accept the proposals which I put to you and to the Government of Turkey.

These proposals seemed to me to embody equitable, realistic and reasonable arrangements that could form the basis of an agreed solution. I was encouraged to find that my Government in Washington took the same view. However, as you know, the Government of Turkey is finding as much difficulty in accepting these proposals as you are, although it has not, as I understand it, finally rejected them. It seems clear from the attitude of the Government of Turkey that any other proposals closer to your position would, a fortiori, be unacceptable.

In view of the response to my proposals, there appears to be an im- passe at least for the present. I have no further suggestions as to a solution.

I would hope, however, that you and your Government would consider very solemnly the dangerous alternatives to a peaceful settlement.

In the final paragraph of your letter, you say it remains now to work for the maintenance of peace in Cyprus. This surely should be the goal of the Government of Greece and all other Governments concerned. The establishment and maintenance of security on the island and the restoration of normal life for all of its inhabitants is the essential pre-requisite for avoiding the catastrophe of a military clash between Greece and Turkey. If peaceful conditions prevail, emotional pressures will be greatly reduced. Elemental protection of life and livelihood in Cyprus might produce a new atmosphere in both Greece and Turkey and permit resumption of efforts to reach a wider solution.

During our latest conversations here with Ambassador Nicolareizes and Mr. Sossides, I put forward some personal ideas as to what your Government might do to stabilize and normalize the situation on the island. Mr. Sossides has undoubtedly reported these to you, and I hope you will give them consideration. Any harassment of Turkish-Cypriots will end whatever hope remains of a peaceful solution of Cyprus, problems. I shall not say more, but ask you to believe that these words, in a literal sense, represent my most solemn prognosis.