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Missed Opportunity: Denktash-Clerides Letters, Spring & Summer 1971 The intercommunal negotiations resumed
in 1968 and continued right up to the troubles of 1974. The two interlocutors
for their communities were Rauf Denktash for the Turkish Cypriots, and Glafkos
Clerides for the Greek Cypriots, the same two who continued to be, off and on,
the main negotiators throughout the remainder of the century. What is
interesting about these letters is that they demonstrate, as the set from the
early 1960s also did, that the parties were never very far apart on significant
issues; most of what separated them were procedural matters that could have been
negotiated, had the will been present for a settlement. At root of the
ostensible differences was again the matter of local self-governance. Of course,
Clerides was not wholly in control of his side=s
negotiations, just as Denktash was not the sole decision maker on his
side. What happened in this period was a classic missed opportunity to
settle the issue, as all sides now acknowledge. Denktash=s letter to Clerides, April 27, 1971 27 April 1971 Dear Glafkos, In view of recent public statements by your side on the ultimate Greek-Cypriot policy on Cyprus I have had some doubts about the use of continuing the talks which has, as an aim, the finding of a permanent solution based on independence. As, however, your letter of 9 April 1971 (in reply to my letter of 13 March) still seems to tackle the problem on the basis of independence I thought it right to put on record my personal views and sound you on some points, before putting the whole matter to my side. It appears to me to be essential to re-affirm our terms of reference for the exploratory, informal talks which we have been having for almost three years. I believe we had agreed that we would be searching for a permanent solution based on independence and not an independence which one side or the other could utilize for furthering "national aims and aspirations. " In other words we would talk independence as an end in itself and not as a means to an end. Secondly, we would be talking - - as indeed we have - - purely on the internal Constitutional matters and would not be tackling the international status of the independence which we would suggest to our respective sides, this being a matter to be discussed by all the interested parties at a later stage. Thirdly, whatever we discussed was to be - - as you reiterate in your above referred letter - -ad referendum to our respective principals in the form of a package deal and, therefore, until there was an agreed package by us, there was no binding agreement on any specific matter. I shall be grateful if you kindly confirm that the above statement also conveys your understanding of the position. In view of the serious doubts raised by recent statements made by your side indicating utter disagreement of the first condition set out above, I should like to point out that in trying to settle our problem on the basis of a package deal I have always taken it for granted that the remaining parts of our Constitution will stand in its present form, subject to such minor adjustments necessitated in the light of agreement on the package deal. In our discussions on the executive I had indicated my readiness to forego the veto rights, in Foreign Affairs, Defence and Internal security, but I note from your letter of 9 April 1971 that your position vis-a- vis the vice-president is quite different viz, you would consider having a vice president if he were merely a figurehead. I should like, therefore, to underline the fact that apart from readiness to forego these veto rights I am not in any position to write off the existing duties and powers of the vice-president. I feel, very strongly, that in our form of society peace, understanding and mutual trust can only be cultivated by the two Supreme Heads of the Executive working in full harmony for the good of Cyprus. On the question of the Communal Chambers your stand has been that the Turkish side can continue to have its Communal Chamber as set out under Part V of the Constitution with all its powers and functions as at present. You have rejected my offer that your side should re-constitute the Greek Communal Chamber which has been "abolished" unilaterally since the troubles. I shall take this matter up below in considering the package deal, but would like to underline, once again, the political position which has arisen due to your refusal to re-constitute the Greek Communal Chamber: All religious, educational, cultural and teaching matters; personal status; marriage, divorce; Courts dealing with Civil Status and religious matters; charitable and sporting foundations, bodies and associations created for the purpose of promoting the well-being of the respective Communities; taxation for above purposes; promoting the aims pursued by the Municipalities; controlling producer's and consumer's co-operative and credit establishments, supervision of municipal functions are amongst the powers and duties of the Communal Chambers. After abolishing the Greek Communal Chamber your side has (a) Created an unconstitutional ministerial post viz: Minister of Education of Cyprus when this Ministry deals purely with the Greek educational affairs. This is a political usurpation of our rights and an imposition upon us which we cannot accept. (b) You have put a number of priests on the pay-roll of the Republic thereby forcing the Turkish-Moslem taxpayers to finance Greek religious affairs and thus cutting across the whole foundation of keeping such matters as Communal matters. (c) The Greek co-operative activities have become Governmental activities. (d) Greek Municipalities are run by bodies appointed by the "government" (e) Greek Social and Sporting Foundations, bodies and associations are now part and parcel of matters supervised by "government". Your claim, therefore, that "the Greek side shall not re-establish its Communal Chamber" is not purely a Greek matter to be decided by your side; such a decision involves the political and financial rights of the Turkish community and upsets the political, financial and social equilibrium which had been set up by the 1960 Agreements to the detriment of the Turkish community. If we are to agree to the abolition of the Greek Communal Chamber (on the assumption that later we may find a formula whereby we may agree to the non-establishment of the Greek Communal Chamber) we must be assured of the following: (a) The unconstitutional post of the "Ministry of Education of Cyprus" must be abolished and Greek Education as such must be given to the President; the Turkish Education to the Vice-President. By decree they can each nominate a person to take charge of the Greek and Turkish education respectively. (b) The salaries of the priests must be taken out of the budget of the Republic. (c) Financial aspect of giving the functions of the Greek Communal Chamber to the "governmental" departments must be reviewed and adjustments must be made of the funds which will be given to the Turkish Communal Chamber so that we do not suffer any discrimination. For the same reason the Greek Co-operative Movement must be divorced from "Governmental" union or some formula, similar to the one suggested above on education must be found for the two Co-operative Movements. All in all, I hope you'll agree that the wisest way will be to retain the structure set out in our Constitution and to retain the two Communal Chambers in their present form. If we do not do so the parity of treatment and status of the "Communal Affairs" of the two communities will have been destroyed and injustice done to the Turkish side as already done in the question of forced payment of priests' salaries! As regard Article 171 on Sound and Vision broadcasting: I have suggested that this Article should be re-drafted subject to the right of the Turkish Community to set up its own sound and vision broadcasting. I have noted that you do not confirm, in your letter of 9 April, the fact that you had stated to me your agreement on the incorporation of Turkish municipal areas in the Turkish local authority context in conjunction with the grouping of such authorities (vide my letter of 13 March). I take this to be an oversight, and would like confirmation please. 2. I feel it necessary to know your final views on the above, as this knowledge will have an important bearing on our evaluation of the Greek Cypriot policy on Cyprus. In view of recent public statements on Enosis, my side finds itself in utter confusion and the belief that we are being invited into an agreement on independence which will be used as a spring-board for Enosis has gained ground. I mention this in order to enlighten you on the real purpose of my seeking clarification on the above points, which, in view of what has been said and done recently by your side, is of utmost importance to us. 3. Assuming that your answer on the above will be affirmative my views on the package deal are as follows: The police: (a) On the question of the police the Turkish side has indicated its willingness to agree
(iii) To retain Article 132 whereby "forces stationed in parts inhabited in a proportion approaching one hundred per centum only by members of one Community shall belong to that community"; (iv) To retain Article 131 which provides that the Head and the Deputy Head shall not be of the same Community; in return for having police or peace-keeping officers with jurisdiction solely in local authority areas. In all parts of the world where local authorities exist, they have their own peace-keeping authorities. This, in no way hampers the smooth functioning of the Central Police Authorities in matters which fall within their jurisdiction. Local police will be there to help the Central police authorities to carry on with their duties, while giving to the local people that sense of security which is so vital in view of the behaviour of the Greek policemen during the inter-communal troubles. In view of the important concessions which we are prepared to make on d) and (ii) above I hope you'll agree to the setting-up of local authority police and thus complete the discussion on this matter. The judiciary:
(i) I would be prepared to accept your offer of 5 Greek 2 Turkish Judges (provided provision is made for Turkish judges to sit on every appeal in which Turks are involved) if you will agree to my proposals for retaining Article 159. On the question of the Courts one matter remains unsettled, although we had discussed it, in the early stages of our talks, and that is, the nature and character of the Courts which will be dealing purely with "local authority" matters. I presume elected or honorary justices of the peace could attend to such matters. (ii) If you agree to accept 6 Greek and 3 Turkish judges in the Supreme Court, subject to the provision above, I would be willing to make Article 159 optional for the litigants as proposed by me during our talks. In case (i) above is agreed upon it will be essential to make a transitional provision for securing the seat of our third judge in the Supreme Court pending retirement. The legislative: (c) On the legislative, in view of your agreement that (i) The Constitution shall not be amended except with the 2/3 votes of the Turkish Members and your acceptance of the present electoral procedure whereby members of the House are elected on separate Greek and Turkish electoral rolls I am willing to agree to your proposal of having two vice-presidents (one Turkish) of the House and to have the president and the vice- presidents elected by all the members jointly if you agree that the House will have 60 Greek and 15 Turkish members; instead of 48 Greeks and 12 Turks as proposed by you. I am also prepared to abandon the present system whereby any amendment of the election law should be with the majority votes of the Turkish members if you agree that the first Election Law be drafted and agreed upon prior to the signing of the agreement in general subject to its binding constitutional effect for the purposes of its amendment later on. The executive: (a) Subject always to the basic requirement for all alternatives, that Turkish representation all through the political and administrative hierarchy shall be not less then 20%, I propose the retention of the present system as set out in the Constitution, subject to the removal of the right of veto and consideration of what new powers will be given to the President and the Vice-President in the light of our overall agreement -Alternatively- (b) I am willing to consider the abolition of the Council of Ministers and adoption of a full presidential system as in U.S.A. subject to the retention of the powers of the Vice-President as at present and consideration of what new powers will be given to the President and the Vice- President in the light of our overall agreement. -Alternatively- (c) I am willing to consider the abolition of the existing Presidential system subject to provision that where the president is a Greek the Prime Minister shall be Turkish (elected by Turks) with adequate Turkish seats in the Cabinet, (as in Lebanon) and agreement on the rights and powers of the P.M. and the Cabinet, In (a), (b) and (c) above the question of Minister of Education should be settled in the light of observations made above on this point. Two junior ministerial posts (one Greek one Turkish) may be considered as an alternative to my suggestions above, responsible to the President and Vice-President respectively. In Belgium there are, I understand, two such ministries. Local Government: (including Turkish municipal areas) I propose that (a) The powers, duties, and jurisdiction of the local authorities should be embedded in great detail in the Constitution. Your offer that this should be done through legislation to be passed by the House is not acceptable to us in view of the past record of the House which had stalled on the passing of the necessary legislation for the municipalities and thus created a political impasse on a purely municipal issue. (b) That the Central Authority or Coordinating body for local governments should be (i) The Greek and Turkish Communal Chambers, or -Alternatively- (ii) The president and a committee appointed by him from amongst the elected Greek members, for the Greek local authorities; the vice-president (or the prime minister) and a committee appointed by him from amongst the elected Turkish members for the Turkish local authorities; or - Alternatively- (iii) Two junior ministerial posts (one Greek and one Turkish) to be created to look after Greek and Turkish local authority affairs responsible to the President and Vice-President respectively; I cannot accept your offer that the autonomous local bodies should be under the District Officer for any purpose; because this is not compatible with their autonomy. In case of ultra vires the Courts will have the right to look into any complaint lodged by any person or authority of the Republic. 4. So far I have indicated to you my willingness to advice my side to make concessions on practically all points which you have raised with me in return for agreement on local autonomy affairs - the only ground on which the Turkish side has put forward balancing demands. Your side has shown willingness to pocket all the concessions without any reciprocity on any Turkish demand. Your list of concessions on page 6 of your above-referred letter is somewhat misleading. The Turkish side has not asked for the amendment of the Constitution. It is the Greek side which has put forward certain proposals for amendment and practically on all these points we have tried to accommodate you. Our counter offers made with a view to softening the Greek blow of drastic amendments is being treated by you as "acceptance of Turkish offers", whereas these were indications to you as to the limit of our accommodation in agreeing to your proposals. The only grounds on which we have asked for something has been the local autonomy, and on this ground you have not even agreed to the Status of the authority which we are to setup. Our demand has been for local autonomy, your offer has been on limited local authority. In order to complete this review I would like to put on record, once again, the vital concessions which I have indicated willingness to make; concessions, for which, the Greek side seems determined not to give anything in return, thus raising the pertinent question whether the exercise of the local talks was merely for amending the 1960 Constitution in such a way as to make the Independent Republic of Cyprus a convenient spring-board for Enosis! My whole purpose in these talks has been to amend the Constitution in such a way as would satisfy your side's demands without diminishing in any way or form the juridic stat- us of the Turkish Community and without imperiling the ultimate safety of the independence of Cyprus: Concessions which the Turkish side has shown willingness to make: (a) Abolition of the provisions of the Constitution which necessitated the appointment of non-Cypriots to the posts of Presidents of the Supreme Constitutional Court and the High Court; (b) The amalgamation of the Supreme Constitutional Court with the High Court; (c) The amalgamation of the gendarmerie with the police; (d) Reduction of Turkish participation from 30% to 20%; (e) Abolition of the provision of the Constitution requiring majority vote of both Communities in the public commission; (f) Abolition of the provision of the Constitution requiring separate majority votes in the House on legislation dealing with all taxation matters, elections, municipalities. (g) Abolition of veto powers in Foreign Affairs, Defence and Internal Security; (h) Reduction of Turkish participation in the Army from 40% to 20%; (i) Making it optional, for litigants to resort to the protection of Article 159. (j) Reduction of Turkish participation from 30% to 20% in Town Planning Affairs as per Article 176. I hope the above will give us a new ground for tackling the problem anew in a spirit of give and take. So far the Turkish side has been on the giving end; I hope your side will find it possible to be a little generous and understanding so that we can reach agreement on all outstanding issues. Yours sincerely, Rauf R. Denktash
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