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Jonathan Cook
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After the unprecedented defeat of Israel in its 33-day war against Lebanon’s Hezbollah, the Zionist regime’s identity crisis intensified as it feared losing US support because of being a liability.
Because of conflicting media analyses about the nature of Israeli politics and its approach toward Palestinians, Iran Daily’s Amir Tajik interviewed Jonathan Cook, the British writer, journalist and Middle East analyst, who resides in the Nazareth city in the occupied Palestine.
Cook explains how Israel is riven with ideological, religious, class, and ethnic differences. Excerpts:
AMIR TAJIK: Israel is often touted by the western media as the only democratic state in the Middle East. Is that true?
JONATHAN COOK: No. Israel is a democracy if you are a Jew, just as apartheid South Africa was a democracy if you were white. But that is not what we usually mean by democracy. At least a fifth of Israel’s population is non-Jewish, most of them Palestinians, and they are systematically discriminated against in all spheres, including in access to resources like land and to political power, and in control of immigration. I have exposed the myth of Israel’s self-description as a Jewish and democratic state at length in my book Blood and Religion. It is a necessary myth in the West because it justifies the huge sums of aid and military support the West gives to what is effectively a rogue, highly militarized ethnic state.
Efforts by western countries to resolve the Palestinian crisis are overwhelmed by their concerns for Israeli security. What should be done to change the situation and achieve a sustainable and fair solution?
The first problem is to understand that Israel is acting in bad faith in negotiations. All other problems flow from this simple fact. Israel has no interest in peace or in dividing the land. It needs war against the Palestinians and against neighboring states to justify its perception in the West as an eternal victim (first of European anti-Semitism, and now of Arab and Muslim anti-Semitism) and consequently its receiving Western military largesse. It was with the help of the West, for example, that Israel was able to develop nuclear weapons without control or supervision.
And similarly Israel has no interest in allowing the Palestinians to develop a national home, even on the 22 percent of their original homeland that Israel now occupies. Such a Palestinian state would, in Israel’s view, be the first stage in the unraveling of the Jewish state. If the land were divided, the pressure would mount for Israel to stop being an ethnic state and become a proper state, with normal rules of equal citizenship inside its own borders. If there were equal rights, Palestinian citizens of Israel would be able to demand that their relatives enjoy the same right to return to Israel that Jews currently enjoy to come to Israel. Very soon, the whole artifice of a Jewish and democratic state would collapse.
Jews were promised “a peaceful land“ in occupied Palestine when they were encouraged to move there from around the world. Now they’re living like soldiers, constantly fighting for their own security. Given this background, who is an Israeli?
The idea of who is an Israeli is very fuzzy, even in Israel. I would argue that the founders of Israel actually put greater weight on the talents of their lawyers than the courage of their soldiers. Uniquely, Israeli law has divorced the idea of Israeli citizenship from Israeli nationality, so one must consider them separately.
There is a loose sense in which there are Israeli citizens: that is, all the people who have citizenship inside Israel, including 1.2 million Palestinians who are also Israeli citizens. But this concept is not very helpful as there are different kinds of Israeli citizen, with different sets of rights. Certainly, Palestinian citizens of Israel have lesser rights than Jewish citizens, as expressed in more than 30 laws that privilege the rights of Jews over non-Jews. Also, Jews are treated under Israeli civil law when they move into the occupied territories as settlers, whereas Palestinian citizens are increasingly likely to be treated under Israeli military law when they visit Palestinian relatives in the “closed military zones“ in the occupied territories.
As for Israeli nationality, this does not officially exist. Israel offers its citizens a range of more than 130 different nationalities, including “Jew“ and “Arab“, but not “Israeli“. This is because Israel is the state of the Jews, so the only nationality that counts in Israel is Jewish nationality. In this way, all Jews wherever they live -- even outside Israel -- are in some sense Israeli nationals, whereas Palestinian citizens of Israel cannot be real nationals because they are not Jewish.
How widespread is the identity crisis among Israelis?
Very widespread. Israel is riven with ideological, religious, class and ethnic differences. The ultra-Orthodox Jews are mostly not Zionists; the settlers are driven by an ideology that is seen by some as potentially jeopardizing the Jewish state’s earlier territorial successes; the Arab Jews, the Mizrahim, are treated as inferior Jews by the European Ashkenazim; the military-industrial elite views the state as a vehicle for their own financial exploitation of Palestinians and other Jews. But these deep differences are subsumed in a bigger manufactured Jewish consensus that regards the ’Arabs’ as an existential threat to Israel because they are seen as forever plotting to commit genocide against the Jews. As long as Jews can be persuaded of this existential threat, they largely agree to put aside their differences. This is another reason why Israel has little reason to make peace with the Palestinians.
What differentiates Israeli political parties? What are their common points?
The various Jewish political parties reflect a fairly narrow internal disagreement about how best to secure the interests of Israel as a Jewish state. (There are a few Palestinian parties but by the agreement of the Jewish parties they have almost no influence on the political process.) That means that there is a large area of consensus among the Jewish parties: all are agreed that a Right of Return of Palestinians must be prevented at all costs; all are agreed that a bi-national state, a confederation or a power-sharing arrangement with the Palestinians is out of the question; and all are agreed that privileges for Jewish citizens must be preserved and that Palestinian parties should have minimal influence.
Where they differ is on the question of what are the best conditions needed to secure a Jewish state.
Do you think Israel will ultimately accept the formation of a Palestinian state?
No, or at least not in the sense commonly understood as statehood. As might be expected of a state, Israel has only its own interests at heart and, as I’ve already argued, peace and land division are not considered among them. Instead, it wants to create a Jewish fortress, from which all Palestinians will be excluded, including its 1.2 million Palestinian citizens. That Jewish space will be in expanded borders that will include much of the West Bank. What will be left to the Palestinians will be the territorial scraps left over: the Gaza Strip, and a number of isolated ghettoes in the West Bank, possibly connected by tunnels under Israeli military control. If it can be engineered, Israel will make sure those ghettoes come under rival and competing Palestinian leaderships, as it has already achieved in Gaza. One day those scraps of land may come to be referred to as a Palestinian state by the international community.
I suspect Israel would prefer such an outcome because then it can argue that it has the right to transfer its Palestinian citizens into the Palestinian state. In short, Israel’s goal is to imprison the Palestinians in a series of ghettoes, but eventually the West may come around to calling those prisons a state.