[cap-talk] Firefox breaks the principle of identifiability

[Tyler Close]

On Feb 7, 2005, at 10:25 PM, Jed Donnelley wrote:

> At 09:37 PM 2/7/2005, Tyler Close wrote:
> ...
>> I want to continue to delay the introduction discussion until we nail 
>> down the phishing part of the discussion, but I will get to it if you 
>> want to.
> ...
>
> I'm ready to hear it.  Perhaps you could just point me to some stuff 
> on your YURLs.

For now, I am just going to give you some links. I really want to try 
the discussion in steps this time. We've had this discussion on 
cap-talk before (maybe before you arrived) and not made much progress. 
I suspect it's because everyone just piles all naming related problems 
onto the discussion all at once, and then we circle around it 
endlessly. Petnames + YURLS + keyword servers do provide a complete 
solution, but I guess it's just too much to communicate all at once. 
Petnames all on their own provide important and tangible benefits, and 
establishing that fact might make communicating the rest of the system 
easier.

The YURL Definition paper you've already seen is a requirements 
specification. The httpsy protocol is an implementation of these 
requirements. See:

http://www.waterken.com/dev/YURL/httpsy/

This specification explains the crypto and networking part of the 
solution.

An example introduction scenario is examined in the paper at:

http://www.waterken.com/dev/YURL/Schneier/

The home page for all these papers is at:

http://www.waterken.com/dev/YURL/

There are many papers under that root that explore different parts of 
the naming problem. Taken together, they might give you a more complete 
picture of what we have in mind. For now, I want to continue to focus 
the discussion on the phishing aspect. If we reach consensus on just 
that part, we will have made important progress, and done much better 
than we have on previous tries.

Tyler

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The web-calculus is the union of REST and capability-based security:
http://www.waterken.com/dev/Web/