Unit 7: Renaissance / Italian City-States
The Political Structure of the Republic of Florence, 1439
From Leonardo Bruni. On the Constitution of the Florentines. As reproduced in The Renaissance, trans. Athanasios Moulakis, ed. Eric Cochrane and Julius Kirshner (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), 140-144.

Since you wish to know about the constitution of our city, of what sort it is and how it is put together, I will try to set it forth for you in writing as clearly as possible. The constitution of the Florentines is neither entirely aristocratic nor entirely democratic, but a mixture of the two. ... [Some] families, prominent because of the number of dependents and the wealth that they enjoy, are excluded from holding public office in this city: this is contrary to [the rule of] aristocracy. On the other hand, the city does not receive into the commonwealth menials and the lowest classes of the populace: and this is contrary to democracy. Thus avoiding extremes, the city inclines toward the middle way, or rather toward the best. ...

The assembly of the people is held very rarely ... because everything is arranged for ... and the magistrates and councils have such powers over public affairs that calling an assembly is necessary only if a great change should occur ... and the commonwealth is badly shaken up. Then, the whole people is called together, and the assembly has the supreme power. But as we said, this happens very rarely.

The highest office in the city is that of the nine magistrates whom we call priori. Of these, only two are popuolari of the [lesser] guilds; all the rest are drawn from the best and the richest citizens. First among these is the standard-bearer of justice, who is chosen only from those prominent in honors and lineage. These nine magistrates are assisted by other men who act as advisors and assistants ... [who] are summoned by the Nine whenever some common concern must be acted upon. These men are called colleghi, as if one would say "counsillors." Now, the nine priori, together with the said colleghi, have great powers, of which the greatest is that nothing can be referred to the great councils that has not first been resolved upon by the Nine and the Councillors.

There are two great councils in this city, one of the people with three hundred members, the other of the most prominent citizens, with two hundred. Those matters that come up are first considered carefully by the Nine and the Councillors and voted upon by them. They are then referred to the Council of the People; if they are approved there, they are brought before the Council of the Prominent (of the Commune). If they are passed by this council as well, they are then put into effect; having been put through in this manner, we say they have the force [of law]. ... [The same procedure is followed with regard to] war and peace, the conclusion and dissolution of alliances, the rendering of accounts by public officials, exemptions from public burdens, the performance of public duties, and all that regards the affairs of the city. If, however, the Council of the People does not accept the deliberations and decisions of the Nine and the Councillors, these are invalid and cannot be referred to the other council. If the Council of the People consents but the Council of the Prominent does not, ... the deliberations are ... null and void. Thus three votings are necessary: first, the one taken by the Nine and the Councillors; second, the one taken by the Council of the People; and third, the one taken by the Council of the Prominent.

You now see ... something of the form of this commonwealth. The great councils are like an assembly of the people, while the Nine and the Councillors are like a council, so that it is permissable to say of laws approved in this manner, as we are accustomed to do, that they have been "decreed by the Council and the People of the Florentines."1

Since the magistrates do all these things, let us now see how and from what kinds of persons they are chosen. Every five years, elections are held in this manner: the nine Priori and the Councillors and some others gather in the Palace and scrutinize all the citizens, voting separately on each one. Whoever receives two-thirds of the votes is declared elected, not in order to assume office at that time, but as one who has been found worthy to assume it should he be chosen by lot. The name of each of those voted upon and deemed worthy is written down separately and placed in purses according to the part of the city [in which he resides]. This city is divided into four parts, which we call quarters. There are therefore that many purses in which are kept the names of those who have been deemed worthy of office. When the time arrives to choose new magistrates, the names are taken by lot from the purses, that is, two for each part of the city. Separate purses are kept in each quarter for the election of the standard-bearer (gonfaloniere) since this honor passes from one quarter of the city to another [by turns] and is a sort of hegemony in which the whole city ought to participate. The selection of the two kinds of Councillors occurs in the same manner as that of the Priori. Some are leaders of the companies and are chosen according to their companies. There are sixteen companies in the city, and each one has its own leader. The others are the so-called "Good Men" (Buoni Uomini) and are chosen not according to company, but according to quarter, that is to say, three men from each of the quarters. There thus result twenty-eight men who are advisors and councillors of the nine Priori.

We have said that there are two great councils in the city, one of the people and one of the best (aristoi). These also are chosen by lot [from among those] first scrutinized and deemed worthy [to hold office,] and have had their names put in purses according to their company. For others than these, elections are held not every five years, but as often as is needed. It is common to all the above-mentioned magistrates to be chosen by lot after having been put to a vote and deemed worthy of holding office. But they are not chosen if [they are found to have] some impediment or obstacle. There are many such impediments: first, age; second, parentage; third, time; fourth, failure to pay taxes. Age is an impediment for the young, for no one under thirty years of age can be among the Nine or the Councillors; nor can he be a standard-bearer if he is under forty-five or a member of the great councils if he is under twenty-five. Parentage often prevents one from taking office. If my brother or father or son or relative holds office, I cannot do so; for the law forbids two members of the same family being in office at the same time. Time is an impediment to those who have previously been magistrates. They may not take office again before three years have elapsed; nor can a relative do so before six months have elapsed. There is also another impediment: if someone has not paid the taxes for which he has been assessed, or even if he is a debtor of the public treasury.

These magistrates, chosen in this manner, conduct the city's public affairs. There are different courts, laws, and magistrates for private affairs. These [latter magistrates] are not citizens, but foreigners. Well-known and well-born men from other cities are chosen for this and given salaries from public funds to serve as judges in our city. They judge according to the laws and punish the violent and evil men. There are two of these magistrates. One has jurisdiction over civil cases, contracts, and other such things; the other has the authority to chastise and punish criminals. Their term of office is six months; at the end of their terms, they are examined, and they give an account of their actions before departing. Foreigners are chosen for these duties out of a desire to prevent hatred from being generated among the citizens. He who has been condemned generally hates him who condemned him and bears him a grudge, rightly or wrongly. Moreover, a foreigner is more likely than a citizen to punish correctly and impartially. The death and blood of the punished somehow taints the judge; and it appears to be more offensive in a free city [where citizens are] equals when one citizen kills another. [Finally,] a foreigner will be more afraid than a citizen of the consequences of acting contrary to the law.

It would now be fitting to speak [briefly] of the laws of the city. ... [The] city follows the laws of the [ancient republic of the] Romans, of whom it was a colony. Indeed, Sulla the dictator led the colony here and populated it with Roman nobles. Thus we have the same laws as the metropolis except in those cases where something has changed in accordance with changed times.2

Since the constitution, as we have said, is of mixed nature, it understandably has some elements that tend more to democracy and others more to aristocracy. The provision that the terms of offices be short is democratic. The highest of them, that of the Nine, does not extend beyond two months; and of the Councillors, some have a term of three, others of four months. Instituting short tenures of office tends more toward equality. Democracy also is the high respect we show, in word and in deed, for liberty, which we hold to be the end and purpose of the entire constitution. The choosing of magistrates by lot without regard for the wealth [of the candidate] is also democratic; but many elements of the constitution tend toward aristocracy. The provision that all matters be deliberated beforehand and that nothing be referred to the people that has not been previously decided [upon by the chief magistrates] is aristocratic. Aristocratic also, it seems to me, is the provision that the people have no power of amendment but may only assent or dissent.

This city has experienced some changes, as I believe other cities have, leaning now more toward the multitude, now more toward the best. In former times, when the people were still accustomed to bear arms and fight their own battles, the city destroyed almost all of its neighbors, in part also because it was so populous. Then the strength of the city lay mainly in the multitude; and for that reason the people were preminent--to the point, indeed, of almost excluding the old nobility from the citizen body. With the passage of time, however, the task of waging war was transferred to foreign mercenaries. Thereafter the strength of the city seemed to lie [no longer] in the multitude, but in the best and the richest, for they contributed the most to the public good, albeit with counsel rather than with arms. The power of the people thus quietly dissolved, and the constitution assumed the shape that it now bears.

1The similarity to the ancient Roman formula "by the Senate and People of Rome" (SPQR) was obvious and intentional.

2It was a Renaissance fantasy too good for Bruni to pass up to suppose that his city's laws were directly descended from those of ancient Rome and had changed only slightly in over a thousand years.


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