Unit 16: Division and Union / 1989
Communism's Collapse
From Stokes, Gale. The Walls Came Tumbling Down. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 3-4, 9, 11.
Students who graduate from college after the turn of the millennium will almost certainly look back on the two great movements of the twentieth century, fascism and communism, with the same sort of incomprehension that students of earlier generations looked back on the religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. How was it possible that two movements whose claims seemed so implausible, almost even comical . . . should have not only attracted millions of enthusiastic followers but, on the basis of what their adherents considered high principle, sent millions of people to anguished deaths? Attuned to a world in which diversity is not only the order of the day but intellectually the only responsible theoretical position, students will need substantial imaginative powers to recreate the mindset in which claims to absolute truth justified dictators in dominating not only their neighbors but their own people as well.

The young people of the next century will need to make this imaginative effort in good measure because of events that took place in Eastern Europe in 1989, when suddenly and--all hindsight to the contrary--quite unexpectedly the hitherto subjugated and passive peoples of Eastern Europe appeared in the streets and threw off the hollow regimes that had ruled them for forty years. In the space of a few months the nations of Eastern Europe, which since 1948 had been considered simply adjuncts of the Soviet system--a bloc of subservient satellites tied by iron apron strings to the motherhood of revolution--showed themselves to be full participants in the drama of European transformation, or at least expectant participants. Economically devastated by forty years of mismanagement, the East Europeans proved to be considerably less politically devastated by forty years of living a lie. Within a few months most of the East European countries established new, non-Communist governments that superficially looked a good deal like democratic systems elsewhere in Europe, began or promised economic reforms, and repudiated the Communist parties that has seemed all powerful only one or two years earlier. How could this have happened with such speed and thoroughness that the old regimes already have receded into the mists of a futile and lost past?

The answer given in this book concentrates on the decay and collapse of communism in Eastern Europe since 1968, the year when an invasion of Czechoslovakia by Soviet-led forces ended any realistic hopes that the system of central planning and totalitarian political aspiration could reform itself. But the historical setting in which the decline of "real existing socialism," as East European communism styled itself in the 1980s, took place is a very broad one. The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe was a significant milestone in the history of the fundamental transformation human societies have undergone over the past few hundred years. Even though this process has no generally accepted name--the industrial revolution, the great transformation, the energy revolution, the great transition, and many others have been proposed--it is clear that something quite remarkable has occurred. Devices that convert chemical energy into useful work through electricity and internal combustion engines dominate the daily life of the industrial world. Information systems, beginning with printing by movable type, moving onto the newspaper and the telegraph, and today characterized by television and the computer, daily place enormous amounts of data into the hands of billions of people. Transportation systems, limited two hundred years ago to the speed of the horse, now routinely move large numbers of people and goods at high speeds hundreds, even thousands, of miles in a single day. In the industrialized world most human beings no longer live in rural areas as they did for ten thousand years after the invention of agriculture but in huge urban agglomerations, often covered with foul-smelling air. Gender relations, family linkages, work habits, ways of dying, care of the sick--in short, every aspect of life--has changed, often dramatically, in the last few hundred years.

...

East European history from World War II until 1989 can be characterized as a sudden, spasmodic movement of imposition of [the] principles of mature Stalinism followed by thirty-five years of adjustment, tinkering, reform, backsliding, and frustration. In broadest terms this history can be divided into halves, the period before the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, when it still seemed possible that socialism could work, and the period after 1968, when almost everyone realized it could not. . . .

. . . [E]fforts at economic reform came to an end in 1968 when political events . . . led to the crushing of the "Prague Spring" by an invasion of Soviet and Warsaw Pact troops. The invasion of Czechoslovakia and the subsequent enunciation of the Brezhnev Doctrine, which stated that the Soviet Union would aid any previously established socialist regime to stay in power, marked the end of the era when serious people could hope that it would be possible to change the socialist system from within, either economically or politically. By giving notice that it would not tolerate any fundamental deviations from a neo-Stalinist model of socialism nor permit any meddling with its East European sphere of hegemony, the Soviet Union chilled the new winds that had been blowing through Eastern Europe.

This not only called forth a resigned form of political apathy, but it also killed any chance that socialism would be able to repair its economies. Leonid Brezhnev tried a few marketizing reforms briefly in the Soviet Union, but the relative openness they implied struck at the heart of the hyperrationalist principle that the party, as the bearer of the true view of history, was the only agent that had the right to direct society. Confronted with the necessity of adopting the intensive strategy and entering the world market, the Soviets chose instead to stick with the increasingly obsolete extensive strategy. This seemed a safe and comfortable thing to do, but in fact it doomed the East European economies to eventual collapse at the very moment that the environment of world trade was changing decisively. The Soviet-imposed policy of inward-looking mutual trade conducted by central planning agencies isolated the East Europeans from the stimulus of the rapidly changing world economy and thus hindered them from making the only structural improvement that held long-term promise--increased productivity. When Brezhnev and his counterparts in Eastern Europe made their decision that the economic and political reforms proposed in Czechoslovakia in 1968 were too dangerous for socialism, they signed the death warrant of the system they thought they were saving.


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